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EVALUATING THE FOOD SYSTEM WITH A NODDINGS-STYLE CARE ETHIC 
 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to provide a new account of the issue of ethical food, through 
arguing that a Noddings-style care ethic can provide individual moral guidance and structural 
critiques of policies and institutions of the food system. This care ethic claims that moral goodness 
is found in caring relations between persons, and that creating, maintaining, and enhancing such 
relations while cultivating a caring character is the goal of care ethicists. Caring in this context 
refers to a complex and dynamic process: the carer’s recognition of needs in the cared-for, the 
carer’s desire to see those needs met, attending to those needs, and then response of the one 
receiving care to the carer.  
The care ethic is paradigmatically concerned with relation between two people. So it might 
seem unclear how it could be useful for problems that involve l ts of people, many of whom are 
strangers to each other. In a globalized world especially, it might seem that such an ethic doesn’t 
have much to contribute to problems in the public sphere. Indeed, some philosophers have argued 
that a care ethic is only useful in the private sphere and must be paired with a justice ethic for 
issues in the public sphere. So when discussing an issue like eth cal food, where much of the food 
consumed in countries like the United States is produced and delivered to the end consumer 
through complicated supply chains, the ability of a care ethic to be useful in making ethical 
recommendations may seem particularly tenuous. 
In particular, it has been argued that Nel Noddings’s ethic of care does not generate global 




with these claims, and most recently has stated that she thinks the care ethic must be paired with a 
justice ethic to be useful in the public sphere.  
There are contrasting views, however. At one point Noddings made the case that her ethic 
is useful for structural critiques of moral issues in contemporary society, giving an account of a 
caring social policy solution to homelessness in western cou tries. She also claimed that moral 
orientation towards strangers is important for the carer, lthough not as important as that towards 
persons we actually encounter. Another philosopher made a case that Noddings’s ethic does 
generate global moral concern, because harm becomes embodi d through items like food and pass 
the harm to the person that ultimately consumes it.  
I do think that Noddings’s care ethic, as presented in her 2002 work Starting at Home is 
weak to those criticisms, but I think it is because of two problems. The first problem stems from a 
theoretical misconception of Noddings’s about how we encounter people and how that generates 
care. I argue that Noddings misunderstands the difference between care directed at distant and 
close others. Instead of holding that encounters of others fall into two types, I claim that the two 
types are just paradigms of two ends of a spectrum. The reality of human interaction is messier 
than Noddings’ theory provides for. The second problem is a misunderstanding of critics of the 
moral force of ‘obligation’ within the care ethic and how caring is judged. In part, this may stem 
from a lack of clarity in Noddings’s writings. In responding to this concern, I do not radically 
depart from her writings, but I do synthesize several statements of her into a stronger claim about 
obligation and judgement.  
I defend this new interpretation of a Noddings-style care ethic against the above claims and 
make a case that it is useful in providing ethical recommendations for a problem involving lots of 




this care ethic cannot generate a strong positive obligation between consumers and strangers in 
distant lands, it can provide a coherent account of the moral harms and goods in the food system. 
Moreover, it provides critiques and recommendations regarding the food system that are shown to 
be successful in real life. 
I accomplish this by first comparing two supply chains for coffee, both originating in 
Oaxaca, Mexico and ending in the United States. This analysis shows that the care ethic cannot 
make the case for an encounter or relation between a co sumer and producer distanced in a supply 
chain just in virtue of the many links between them. However, the care ethicist can argue that 
engaging with certain supply chains as a consumer is an ethical hazard at the very least, and in 
some cases a moral failure. I discuss how the care ethicist would deliberate on how to act as a 
consumer and how their actions may be judged within the care ethic. I show that even though there 
is not a strong positive obligation to act towards those we do not encounter, we still put our caring 
selves at risk by turning away from the harms we are complicit in. I believe this makes the case 
that this care ethic does generate a global moral concern. In addition, I consider what the coherent 
ethical questions are for the care ethicist regarding the food system.  
The second discussion analyzes harms and goods in the sysem, using examples of labor 
abuses against migrant agricultural workers and responses to those abuses. The examples I give 
show how the labor structures in the U.S. food system make it very difficult if not impossible for 
people to respond in caring ways to expressions of need. These structures allow and perpetuate 
harms in the food system. If space is made to allow those on the ground to respond with care, then 
harms can be prevented or at least responded to. I argue that motivated by care directed at those 
harmed in the system, we should work to create structures hat allow for caring encounters and 




There is however, still more work to be done on applying the car  ethic to problems in the 
food system and other similar problems. For one, I have not given an account of how the care ethic 
would analyze collectively caused harms such as pollution. In this case the contribution to harm 
from any one individual might be incremental, time-delayed and spatially-delayed. I think there is 
still more theoretical work to be done to coherently explain these problems within the care ethic.  
However, I have begun this discussion here by showing that a Noddings-style care ethic 
can generate global moral concern, and can be useful in critiquing and providing recommendations 
for individual action and structural issues regarding a problem involving lots of people, many of 
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The main goal of this thesis is to argue that a Noddings-style care ethic can provide 
individual moral guidance and structural critiques of policies and institutions of the food system. 
In this paper I look at the U.S. food system and understand it to encompass all those mechanisms 
and structures by which food is produced, processed, distributed, and purchased before being 
consumed in the United States. Those mechanisms and structures that bring food to U.S. 
consumers may be wholly or partially within the United States. This includes food policy, 
defined as “laws, regulations, decisions and actions by governments and other institutions that 
influence food production, distribution and consumption” (Wilde, 2013, p. 1), as well as the 
structures, physical and non-physical, within which these actions occur. 
This care ethic claims that moral goodness is found in caring relations between people, 
and that creating, maintaining, and enhancing such relations while cultivating a caring character 
is the goal of care ethicists. Caring in this context rfers to a complex and dynamic process: the 
carer’s recognition of needs in the cared-for, the carer’s desire to see those needs met, attending 
to those needs, and then response of the one receiving care to the carer.  
The care ethic is paradigmatically concerned with relations between two people. So it 
might seem unclear how it could be useful for problems that involve lots of people, many of 
whom are strangers to each other. In a globalized world especially, it might seem that such an 
ethic doesn’t have much to contribute to problems in the public sphere. Indeed, some 
philosophers have argued that a care ethic is only useful in the private sphere and must be paired 
with a justice ethic to adequately address issues in the public sphere. So when discussing an issue 




produced and delivered to the end consumer through complicated supply chains, the ability of a 
care ethic to be useful in making ethical recommendations may seem particularly tenuous. 
Furthermore, we might wonder if a care ethic can tell us anything different about problems in the 
food system than another ethic.  
A number of philosophers, political theorists, and social theorists have conceived of how 
a care ethic applies to social policies and global humanitarian issues – projects that are similar to 
mine in terms of applying a care ethic to distant others. I have chosen to use Nel Noddings’s care 
ethic as the basis for my argument, as laid out in Starting at Home (2002). The works of Virginia 
Held, Joan Tronto, Margaret Urban Walker, Deane Curtin, Michael Slote, and Fiona Robinson 
also address these problems, although their theoretical approaches differ in some aspects from 
Noddings’s. I have benefited from the dialogue between Noddings and the other authors, and in 
this paper draw from the work of all to clarify and improve upon Noddings’s approach where 
needed.  
Nel Noddings among all of the above-mentioned theorists has been especially concerned 
with describing the ethics of interacting with those near and dear to us. A substantial part of her 
body of work has focused on describing the most intimate and close of caring relations: those in 
the home. This is because her care theory holds that we learn about good caring from examining 
ideal homes. She also frequently writes on issues in education and pedagogy as part of her 
overall project of helping children develop as moral individuals. Because that has been her focus, 
in her own work she has spent less time examining and discussing how carers ethically deal with 
people they are abstracted and distanced from.  
 It has been argued that theories in the style of Nel Noddings’s ethic of care do not 




with people abstracted and distanced from each other . Noddings herself has taken several 
different positions on this. In her early work she agreed with these claims, and thought it wasn’t 
a problem for her theory. Her most recent work has stated that she thinks the care ethic must be 
paired with a justice ethic to be useful in the public sphere. During the late 1990s and early 
2000s, however, she held a position that made a case that her ethic is useful for structural 
critiques of moral issues in contemporary society, giving a  account of a caring social policy 
solution to homelessness in western countries. In those w rks she held that moral orientation 
towards strangers is important for the carer, although not as important as that towards people we 
actually encounter.  
In this thesis I revisit her position in that middle period. I do not think that a Noddings-
style care ethic needs to be paired with a justice ethic in order to be useful in the public sphere, 
even for problems dealing with those distant and abstract from each other. I make a case that 
such a care ethic can generate global moral concern, and can be useful in critiquing and 
providing recommendations for individual action and structural issues regarding the U.S. food 
system. Further, since the care ethic focuses on relationships between people first, I think it 
provides some different critiques of the food system thanother ethics provide. While some of the 
overall structural critiques and recommendations may be similar, the root logic is different. In 
this thesis I point out the efforts of two authors who have in the past tried to extend Noddings 
ethic to such problems: William Garland made a case in a 2000 review that it couldn’t be done. 
Deane Curtin gave an example in a 2001 paper of how it could be done. I disagree with both 
their approaches.  
I do think that Noddings’s care ethic, as presented in her 2002 work Starting at Home is 




because of two problems. I address both of these in Chapter One, where I explain and evaluate 
Noddings’s care ethic and put forth my own Noddings-style care ethic. The first problem stems 
from a theoretical misconception of Noddings’s about how we encounter people and how that 
generates care. I argue that Noddings misunderstands the differ nce between care directed at 
distant and close others. Instead of holding that encounters of others fall into two types, I claim 
that the two types are just paradigms of two ends of a spectrum. The reality of human interaction 
is messier than Noddings’s theory provides for. The second problem is a lack of clarity around 
the moral force of ‘obligation’ within the care ethic and how caring is judged. In part, this may 
stem from a lack of precision in Noddings’s writings. In responding to this concern, I do not 
radically depart from her writings, but I do synthesize several statements of her into a stronger 
claim about obligation and judgement.  
In Chapter 2, I defend this new interpretation of a Noddings-style care ethic against the 
claims of Garland and Curtin and make a case that it is useful in providing ethical 
recommendations for a problem involving lots of people, many of whom are strangers: harms in 
the United States food system. I show that while this care ethic cannot generate a strong positive 
obligation between consumers and strangers in distant lands, it can provide a coherent account of 
the moral harms and goods in the food system. Moreover, it provides critiques and 
recommendations regarding the food system that are shown to be successful in real life. 
I accomplish this by first comparing two supply chains for coffee, both originating in 
Oaxaca, Mexico and ending in the United States. This analysis shows that the care ethic cannot 
make the case for the obligation to form an encounter or relation between any consumer and 
producer distanced in a supply chain just in virtue of the many links between them. However, the 




hazard at the very least, and in some cases a moral failure. I discuss how the care ethicist would 
deliberate on how to act as a consumer and how their actions may be judged within the care 
ethic. I show that even though there is not a strong positive obligation to act towards those we do 
not encounter, we still put our caring selves at risk by turning away from the harms we are 
complicit in. I believe this makes the case that this care ethic does generate a global moral 
concern. In addition, I consider what the coherent ethical questions are for the care ethicist 
regarding the food system.  
The second discussion analyzes harms and goods in the sysem, u ing examples of labor 
abuses against migrant agricultural workers and responses to those abuses. The examples I give 
show how the labor structures in the U.S. food system make it very difficult if not impossible for 
people to respond in caring ways to expressions of need. These structures allow and perpetuate 
harms in the food system. If space is made to allow those on the ground to respond with care, 
then harms can be prevented or at least responded to. I argue that motivated by care directed at 
those harmed in the system, we should work to create structures that allow for caring encounters 
and caring relations to happen. I give an example of such a structure.  
There is however, still more work to be done on applying the car  ethic to problems in 
the food system and other similar problems. I have begun the discussion in this thesis by 
showing that a Noddings-style care ethic can generate global moral concern, and can be useful in 
critiquing and providing recommendations for individual action and structural issues regarding a 











This chapter describes and explains the care ethic I will apply to issues within the U.S. 
food system in Chapter 2. Largely, the version of the car ethic I use is Nel Noddings’s care 
ethic. There are some aspects of her theory, however, with which I disagree. The project I am 
interested in, applying an ethic focused on close relationships to an issue concerned with 
distantly connected people, requires understanding how the care ethic handles the ethical 
orientation of carers towards those two groups of people. It is wi h regard to how Noddings 
handles this difference that I disagree with her theory. Whereas Noddings thinks there are two 
different types of care: one directed at people close to us, and the other at people distant from us, 
respectively, I think that it is one kind of care with differences that lie on a spectrum. So, while I 
endorse many aspects of Noddings’s theory I do offer my own analysis of that particular 
distinction and will try to make it clear where I agree and differ with her work. Additionally, I 
offer a more precise interpretation of obligation and evaluative claims within the care ethic than 
Noddings does in her own work.  
Noddings claims, and I agree, that the care ethic is consequentialist,1 looking to establish, 
enhance and maintain caring relations which are the fundament l good. Care ethicists, to achieve 
this goal, focus on cultivating caring characters. While te overall goal of the care ethic looks at 
effects on caring relations, individual care ethicists are more concerned with responding with 
care to encounter in daily life. Cultivating a caring character is cultivating the skill or practical 
wisdom to respond with care in encounter. This is the work that overall helps caring relations to 
flourish. This chapter is devoted to explaining what caring relations are and what caring 
                                               
1 Consequentalism here refers to theories of morality tha view the moral rightness of acts as a matter of 




responses to encounter are. With that understanding in hand, I turn in the next chapter to 
examining what the care ethic says about problems in the U.S. food system.  
I begin this chapter by clarifying several different technical definitions necessary for this 
discussion. Section 2 delves into more detail on caring-for and explains its role in caring 
relations and encounters. Section 3 then gives my argument challenging Noddings’s view on the 
difference between caring directed at distant people and cring directed at proximate people. In 
Section 3 I offer an alternative view on how to understand hat difference. The last section, 
Section 4, discusses the normative ideals of good care and how we can evaluate care. 
Section 1: The Care Ethic 
This section introduces and defines the care ethic. I begin by putting Noddings’s care 
ethic in context of other care theories. Noddings’s care ethic is in many ways an orthodox care 
ethic. She subscribes to a relational sense of care, and thus focuses on relations between people 
as the basis of moral understanding.2 Noddings’s care ethicist is concerned with responding to 
need with care and avoiding harms. She holds that caring in timate relations has more 
theoretical and practical importance than caring in the public sphere. However, she differs with 
other care theorists on several fronts. I highlight four features of Noddings’s care ethic that 
distinguish it from other care ethics: 1) It has one fundamental good: caring relations, 2) It 
envisions carers as linked in in interconnected and interdependent webs of care, 3) It is 
consequentialist, and 4) The carer’s response to expressions of need is guided by ‘the basic 
attitude,’ e.g. “I am here.”   
                                               
2 Many care ethicists include animals and other living beings in the types of beings we can care for or about. Some 
even widen the moral sphere to include nature or ecosystems. Noddings leaves it open that other living beings could 
be recipients of care, but does not discuss the issue beyond that. In this paper I am primarily concerned with human 
beings as objects of care, and so have not included debate on this topic. For more about these discussions please see 





The Care Ethic 
In this ethic, the focus of moral understanding is in the relations between people. This is 
because the foundational tenet of the care framework is that we exist as interdependent beings. 
From this assumption we understand that to exist as a human is to exist in relation with others. 
Contrast this with an ethic that has a rights framework which views us as fundamentally 
autonomous individuals. A rights-based ethic will be interested in the effects on individual 
rights. A care-based ethic will be concerned with the effcts on relations between people. Thus, a 
rights ethic, asking after what is good, is going to focus on individual rights. A care ethic is 
going to focus on the relations between people to look for the good. In this case the caring 
relation, which is a relation between people that can be characterized as a caring one (a technical 
definition follows below), is the basic good. This sub-section describes the four key 
aforementioned features of Noddings’s ethic that differentiate it from other care ethics.  
1) It has one fundamental good: caring relations  
The caring relation is the basis of ethical understanding for the care ethicist (Noddings, 
2002b, p. 69). A relation is the connection between two individuals, which is comprised of “a set 
of encounter(s)” (Noddings, 2002b, p. 198). Of course in general an encounter just is a meeting 
with someone or something—where ‘something’ is interpreted very broadly—Noddings includes 
stories, institutions, memories, cultural practices, artifacts and objects of learning.3 However, for 
the care ethic it is a particular kind of encounter, that between individuals, that is of interest.  
Noddings states that such encounters are the “fount of experience” and it is through encounter 
that selves and connections between selves are built. 
                                               




Not all relations or encounters can be properly characterized as caring. This may be 
because there is no caring done within the encounter, or because the encounter is uncaring. 
Noddings accedes to the possibility that there could be encounters a d relations within which 
there are “no obvious needs, no requests to be met” (Noddings, 2002b, p.12). She describes such 
an encounter as a friendly chat between two acquaintances. But just because there is a lack of 
obvious needs does not mean there is a lack of any needs. She suggests that “even in this 
situation there are hidden needs, and the conversants may become aware of them if a comment is 
troublesome” (2002b, p.12). The second possibility for an encounter without careis an uncaring 
encounter wherein someone harms another. Here, harm is considered the basic moral wrong, an 
opposite to caring relations. Harming someone means acting with unconcern and disregard for 
care towards the other. Being harmed means experiencing the opposite of care. This can involve 
having our ability to experience caring encounters and relations diminished, or experiencing 
someone’s disregard for oneself. So, an encounter or relation could fall into any of these three 
categories: caring, uncaring, or neither.  
I will also note that a relation differs from a relationship, if by the latter we mean a 
formal relationship like partner, spouse, or friend. When one ends a relationship, one does not 
end a relation—for the set of encounters that comprised that relation still exists, even if the 
formal relationship does not. That said, since relation is basic to an ethic of care, we should 
discuss what a caring relation looks like.  
If a relation or an encounter is to be described as caring, it must meet Noddings’s 
definition as follows (2002b):  
 (A,B) is a caring relation (or encounter) if and only if i) A cares for B—that is, A’s 
consciousness is characterized by attention and motivati nal displacement—and ii) A 




encounter is part of a continuing relationship or series of encounters, B’s responses 
become part of what A receives in the next episode. (p.19)  
 
A caring relation, then, involves both a carer, the one giving care (A), and one receiving 
care, the cared-for (B). Note that to ‘care for’ is a technical term in Noddings’s theory, referring 
to an internal state (described in i) only, separate from the activity (described in ii) of care. 
However, both the internal state of caring-for and the activity of care is encompassed in the term 
‘caring encounter’ or ‘caring relation’. So, we can characterize either an encounter or a relation 
as caring if it fulfills the description above. The caring relation is the fundamental good, but this 
does not mean that caring encounters are unimportant. They are derivatively good as it is 
encounters that make up relations. So, caring encounters are necessary for caring relations.   
The caring relation is good because it affirms that basic tenet of our existence—that we 
are interconnected—and it alleviates the basic harm of disconnection or loneliness. Caring 
relations are grounded in the basic attitude, affirming our cnnectedness. The basic attitude is 
responding to expressions of need with “I am here” - it is an affirmation that the person in need 
is not alone, that another sees them, that another acknowledges their connection and attention to 
the person in need. Noddings thinks this is basic because it is the first response to everyone’s 
original state in this world: infancy (2002b, p.20). We come into the world connected to another 
(a mother-figure), and to be disconnected is traumatic. That mother-figure/infant relationship is 
the (hopefully) first caring relation of our lives. Noddings claims that caring relations also 
support, nurture and are necessary for the health and wellbeing of individuals through responding 
to needs related to three values: “preservation, growth, [and] acceptance” (2002b, p. 20).4 
We also understand then, that things that deny this fundamentl truth of what it is to be 
human in this world are not good. Things that block connection and relation are bad, or at least 
                                               




problematic. Ways of thinking, social structures, physical structures - they can all deny this 
interconnectedness. Loneliness, which in care parlance is th absence of connections to other 
people, is the basic harm. The basic attitude dispels the basic harm by stating “I am here” in 
response to expressions of need. Harm is understood as the inverse of care since the perpetration 
of harm expresses a lack of care and disregard for the importance of relation between people; as 
Carol Gilligan described it, “selfish and immoral in its reflection of unconcern” (Gilligan, 1977, 
p. 492). The response to need with care is the focus of ethical effort. A lack of care or the 
presence of harm is the focus of ethical concern.  
2) It envisions carers as linked in interconnected and interdependent webs of care 
In Caring (1984), Noddings describes the individual as existing “at the center of 
concentric circles of caring” (p. 46). Figure 1 of Appendix 1 illustrates the circles of caring. The 
inner circles in general contain proximate others—individuals whom the carer encounters 
directly, day to day. The innermost circle is made up of th se we love—those for whom “we care 
because we love” (p. 46). As we move outwards we find the circles containing friends and others 
of personal regard. Further outward are the circles containi g those we encounter regularly as a 
part of a job or other responsibility. These circles of care are a way of visualizing the encounters 
with other individuals in our lives, from the regular interactions to the irregular. These circles of 
care are overlaid by chains of care which link us between our current caring relationships and 
potential and future ones. Together these circles and chains make up each individual’s web of 
care. 
The circles of proximate others are often governed in part by rules, codes, or cultural 
norms that guide our interactions. In virtue of certain roles or relationships, we have certain 




that her boyfriend broke up with her and in turn I comfort her in time of need. In virtue of you 
being Liz’s bus driver on the 7 route; she probably won’t tell you about the breakup and it’s not 
your responsibility to comfort her. Epistemic privilege in virtue of a relationship is one way that 
these responsibilities are delineated. Sometimes these roles are formally governed like the role of 
a doctor or lawyer. Sometimes it is less formal, like a community matriarch whose role has 
developed over time.  
The chains of care run from us to those in the circles of proximate others to those they 
care for. Because of these chains of care, we meet those we are linked to “prepared to care” “in 
recognition of these chains” (p.47). For example, I meet my brother’s new girlfriend prepared to 
care because I care for my brother and I know he cares fo  her. We can envision that each carer 
is linked by chains to the circles of care of those in our own proximate circles of care. In this 
way, the web of care connects proximate circles to proximate circles to proximate circles. These 
individuals we are slightly less likely to encounter as concrete, but still more likely than not. 
Outside of the inner circles of proximate others, there are “those I have not yet 
encountered” (p. 47). They may be linked by formal relations, such as future patients at my 
dental practice, or my wife’s grandmother, who I have never met. The carer meets all of these 
with the potential for care, as they are linked to the carer by “those already anchored in the inner 
circles” (p. 47). And further out, Noddings describes the proximate strangers whom the carer 
encounters without any link to the established circles of care. 
3) It is consequentialist 
The ethic is consequentialist because it evaluates the carer’s ethical actions based on 
whether they “establish, maintain, or enhance caring relations” (Noddings, 2002b, p. 30). While 




those relations, care ethicists are concerned with cul ivating virtuous (caring) characters in order 
to achieve that end. So, while “acting to establish, maintain, or enhance caring relations” is a 
good description of the care ethicist’s work, the care ethicist needn’t be consciously guided by 
that principle when acting (p. 30). Care ethicists “make a commitment to be a caring person”, 
meaning a commitment to cultivate a caring character and act from care (p. 30). It is that 
commitment and the continued reflection upon one’s own character and efforts as a carer that 
drives the carer as care ethicist (p. 31).  
Although caring relations are the fundamental good, and care ethicists are concerned with 
establishing, enhancing, and maintaining that good, this does not mean that carers go around 
establishing as many caring relations as possible. This is becaus  the care ethicist is going to 
encounter many people in many different ways and notice in those encounters many expressions, 
but have limited capacity for care. Too many caring relations would strain one’s moral resources. 
This would likely result in some caring relations suffering and thus a failure to enhance and 
maintain some other caring relations. Additionally, it takes two individuals to have a caring 
relation. The carer cannot force a relation to become a caring one. The best the carer can do is to 
express the basic attitude and leave open the possibility for he cared-for to recognize and 
respond to the carer’s efforts.  
The carer also considers the effects of their actions on the web of care. Ideally the carer 
acts to preserve the web of care—if an action has consequences for the web of care, the carer 
must consider these implications. The care ethicist should not attend to some connections in the 
web of care to the exclusion and disconnection of others. Sometimes our establishment, 
maintenance, or enhancement of some relations can come at the cost of others. For example a 




develop a really good, caring relationship with that child. However this will come at the price 
that the second child will likely not have as good of a relationship with the parent. In fact, this 
will likely have additional implications beyond the parent and second child’s relationship. The 
second child might have a bad relationship with the first child, out of jealousy. The ramifications 
could be echoed into relationships and encounters with other family and friends. In this example, 
the parent does establish, maintain, and enhance a caring relation—but it is to the detriment of 
others in the parent’s web of care. The care ethicist is going to be concerned with this broader 
consequence. These are some of the reasons why the carer fo uses on cultivating a caring 
character as the best means to the end, rather than just focusing on the end.  
Those who are practiced and skilled in responding to needs become “sensitive to the 
needs that are revealed in encounter” and become more adept at responding to needs with care 
(Noddings, 2002b, p. 50-52). This practical wisdom helps the care ethicist navigate the 
complicated web of care. When evaluating care, we are interested in whether or not the carer 
responded with care to the needs of those they encountered, and whether they established, 
maintained, and enhanced caring relations in the web of care. Practical wisdom is going to guide 
the carer as to when it is appropriate to establish caring relations and when it is not. More caring 
relations for any individual is good, but only up to a point. At some point, too many caring 
relations may have too many demands on the carer. As a result, the carer themselves and those 
they care for could suffer. In general then, establishing, maintaining, and enhancing caring 
relations is good, and it is the carer’s practical wisdom that guides them as to in which particular 
circumstances it is called for.5  
                                               




4) The carer’s response to expressions of need is guided by ‘the basic attitude’ 
The basic caring attitude, “I am here,” is the attitude with which the care ethicist 
approaches those for whom they care. As noted above, Noddings calls this the ‘the basic attitude’ 
because we respond to the basic needs of infants with “I am here,” when they cry out (p. 129). 
The basic attitude is not “I will attend to your needs,” because the carer can’t or won’t attend to 
all needs. As a basic attitude, that would be misleading and potentially harmful. Rather, the basic 
attitude is an expression of being there for the cared-for; to listen and recognize their need. This 
person is present as witness to the other’s needs, as a carer. It helps explain to the cared-for that 
non-fulfillment of needs is not malicious or a representation of uncaring.  
So Noddings’s care ethicist is concerned with cultivating a caring character in order to 
establish, maintain, and enhance caring relations (the fundamental good) in the web of care. The 
ethical activity of the carer is responding to needs withcare, guided by that basic caring attitude. 
Additionally, the carer is concerned with relations where care is lacking or where harms occur.   
Relational versus Virtue Sense of Care 
Several ethical and moral theories employ concepts of care that are or seem very similar 
to that of the care ethicist—in fact, even among the care ethicists, there is some dispute about the 
concept of care. For Noddings, care is an attribute of r lations and encounters between people 
(2002b, p. 12). Other care ethicists, such as Michael Slote, view care as rooted in the carer’s 
motivational structure. Noddings, Virginia Held, Joan Tronto, and others distinguish their 
‘relational’ concept of care with Slote’s ‘virtue’ concept of care.6 The virtue concept refers to 
when the focus of the care-concept is on the person carig.7 An example of this is when we 
praise someone for caring by donating to a charity, but without any consideration of the actual 
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work done in the charity. The relational sense of care draws our attention “to both parties in a 
situation”, rather than just the carer (Noddings, 2002, p. 19). Here, we cannot assign praise for 
caring by focusing on the one caring, we must also observe the person who is cared for, their 
initial needs and the effect of the caring action (p. 19). Noddings states that “this is very different 
from starting with the carer’s intention (“I care”) and assessing how faithfully the carer carries 
[it] out” (p. 19). The care ethicist still wants to be able to describe someone as being virtuous, but 
virtuous in terms of the care ethicist’s (relational) sense of care. 
Carol Gilligan (1983) argued that acts of care can be seen from a virtue-concept lens or a 
relational-concept lens, calling this a gestalt shift. We can look at the same caring encounter 
from either lens; which lens we use highlights different salient features of the encounter. I will 
illustrate this with an example. One day a friend, J, gives a sandwich to a homeless woman 
panhandling. J might say something like “I gave her food instead of money—I figured she 
needed to eat.” We would probably praise J. We might even praise her wisdom in giving food to 
the homeless person instead of money, since the money c uld have been used for something the 
homeless person ‘doesn’t need’ such as alcohol or other drugs. In the situation described, if we 
praise J for the caring act done for the homeless person (giving her the sandwich), then we are 
using the virtue-concept of care. We are not considering what the homeless person was saying or 
doing at the time, nor are we aware of nor inquiring about her response.  
But the story might not end there. J could go on to say that the woman reacted angrily—
perhaps throwing the sandwich down the road and then saying “I’m asking for money, here, not 
your food.” We ask J a few more questions and learn that the woman was sitting outside a shelter 
known to serve two meals a day to the homeless, and was holding a sign asking for money for a 




as well as the carer, our view of the situation changes. W now understand that this woman may 
have access to food, and so doesn’t need the sandwich. Perhaps she is frustrated with J, because 
what she really needs is to get out of town. We can imagine that if J had asked her, she would 
share that her daughter is graduating and is trying to go to the ceremony. We may no longer want 
to praise J for her actions. Instead we might advise our friend to pay more attention next time and 
be more thoughtful with her caring efforts.  
Alternatively, we can imagine the woman could have reacted thusly: Dismissing the 
sandwich, saying “I don’t need your food. I just got out of county and what I really need is a 
drink.” That might open up a new discussion on whether or not the caring thing to do is then give 
the woman some money. Either way, these exchanges illustrate how just focusing on the carer 
can obscure our understanding of the caring act. We see that when the cared-for is taken into 
consideration, including her context and her response that our evaluation of the caring act 
changed. For Noddings, care encompasses the entire exchange; just examining the motivations of 
our friend J are not enough to evaluate what happened between J and the homeless woman.  
The above example is one of the reasons why I am primarily interested in the relational 
concept of caring: If a care ethic is “primarily a matter of motives, it may neglect unduly the 
labor and objective results of caring” (Held, 2006, p. 20). When our attention is brought 
primarily to the carer and drawn away from the caring work and the cared-for, it becomes easier 
to miss bad examples of care. This is especially true sincein many relations the carer has more 
power or ability than the cared-for, such as when caring for someone who is ill, or a young child. 
This is an argument that has grown largely out of feminist discourse, and one of the reasons why 




problems, the ethic is arranged so that we must look first and primarily to the caring relation, and 
not just the carer.  
For Noddings’s care ethic, and for the version of the care ethic I endorse in this tesis, the 
relational view of care is used. This means that when we evaluate care, we look to both the 
person giving care, the ‘carer’ or ‘one-caring’ and the person receiving care, the ‘cared-for’ or 
‘object of care.’ Additionally, as I explain later in this section, the technical definition of care 
includes both the carer and the cared-for.  
Concepts of Care and Caring 
The terms ‘care’ and ‘caring’ are employed in a multitude of ways both colloquially and 
within the care ethic literature. This section makes clear what types of care and caring are 
ethically important. First, I discuss the different possible objects of caring: people (both real and 
fictional), animals, ideas and abstract concepts, and thigs. This thesis’s care ethic holds that the 
ethically valuable caring is caring directed at people and otherliving beings. I explain why 
Noddings has put forth that view. Second, I discuss the different ways the terms ‘care’ and 
‘caring’ are used in the care ethic literature. The terms can refer to: an internal state of an attitude 
or disposition, an activity or practice, a social relation, a type of labor, or a value (Held, 2006, p. 
36 & 42). In Noddings’s view and my own, the disposition of care, the internal state of caring 
and the activity of caring are component parts of the social relation of caring. That caring social 
relation is technically termed a ‘caring relation’. The internal state is an attentiveness often based 
on a caring disposition toward another’s needs and being disposed toward wanting to see those 
needs met. The practice or activity of care is attending to needs. For Noddings these ideally 
occur together where the caring disposition orients and motivates the internal state of caring for 




possible to have the disposition of care and not act on it, r to perform caring but not have the 
disposition of care. Below I further clarify this technical description by discussing how it differs 
from colloquial uses of the term and the relation betwe n the disposition and the activity of care. 
Objects of ‘Caring’ 
Colloquially, we care about and for many different people, things, and ideas, not all of 
which are the type of care that is of interest to the car ethicist. The care ethicist is interested in 
care where the cared-for, the receiver of some care,is a person. The following examples of 
everyday usage of these terms illustrate the difference between the technical care ethicist usage 
of care and other usages: “I am not working right now, I’m caring for my mom,” “Caring for 
those kids at the school brings me great joy,” “I donated to the shelter because I care about 
animals,” “I drive a Prius because I care about global warming,” “I really care about keeping my 
toes manicured,” or “I don’t care for the pairing of this red wine with this fish.” I argue that the 
first three statements are the kind of care the care ethicist is interested in, while the second three 
are not.  
Let’s examine the examples I gave above. The first two statements, about someone caring 
for their mother and about a teacher or aide or similar caring for kids at a school both describe 
someone performing caring work directly for individual others. The third example also describes 
someone who acted to fulfill the needs of living beings. According to the criteria above, these are 
all examples of the type of care we are interested in here. Consider the next three: ‘Global 
warming’ is not someone or something that has needs, so there is no ‘caring’ that could be done 
to fulfill its needs. One could however, in the care-ethicist-sense, care about the victims of global 
warming, such as people living in coastal areas with rising water lev ls. The second two 




consider trying to fulfill the needs of the object of the care. Those statements are not statements 
of care (for the care ethicist) as they do not refer to a caring act or disposition and/or a person 
receiving care (although they do refer to a carer). These examples show that mere utterances or 
professions of ‘care’ or ‘caring’ do not themselves define instances of caring for the care ethicist. 
Noddings (1984) gives the name “aesthetical caring” to cases where we care for things or 
ideas, in contrast to caring about and for people which she calls “ethical caring,” or as is used 
elsewhere in the literature “authentic caring” (p. 21).8 For the care ethicist, the care that is of 
primary interest is the authentic type of caring, which has as its object a person or living being. 
Noddings is concerned about conflating the two, in case we are l d to believe that the person 
who becomes engrossed in the intellectual or creative to the exclusion of people is living an 
ethical life. She calls such a person the “ ighly intellectualized aesthetic” who is “always apart in 
human affairs, a critical and sensitive observer, to remain troubled but uncommitted, to be just so 
much affected or affected in just such a way” (p. 22). Such characters in literature and life are not 
unknown (Wagner and Moriarty are two that Noddings mentions on p.22). However, being 
engrossed in the intellectual or creative need not debar having an ethical life. 
The worry is that focusing on abstractions, theories, and ideas may take our attention 
away from caring about and for people (p. 21).9 Sometimes we use statements of care about 
ideas, states of affairs, projects and so on as a shorthand way of referring to our care for people. 
The above example of someone saying “I care about global warming” could be such an instance. 
We could understand “I care about global warming” as code for “I care about the consequences 
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in this paper to refer to the concept discussed here. 
9 For more discussion of the relation between ethical caring and aesthetical caring, including the moral hazards of 




of global warming, which includes harms to individuals.” But in other cases, it seems the 
abstraction really is the object of care.  
Noddings gives examples similar to: “She cares about mathematics,” “They care only 
about money,” and “He cares only for his art;” as illustrations of how we can be engrossed with 
ideas and objects (p. 21). There are cultural traditions that support the intellectual, which may 
make us resistant to Noddings’s caution. Many people would be happy if their children cared a 
lot about a topic like mathematics. However, I agree with Noddings that we should not engage in 
aesthetical caring to the point where we are insensitive to human affairs. Authentic caring 
without the aesthetic is fine, but aesthetic caring withou  the authentic is not.  
In this paper’s discussion I am primarily interested in authentic caring. So, for the rest of 
the paper, when ‘care’ or ‘caring’ is discussed, it is the authentic care-ethicist-type-of-care that is 
referenced unless otherwise noted. 
Care as a Disposition, Care as an Internal State, Care as an Activity 
Within the literature, ‘care’ can refer to a disposition, an internal state, and an activity. 
The caring disposition refers to the affective states of love, empathy, sympathy, fellow-feeling 
and the like that help orient one individual (a carer) towards the object of care and their needs. In 
the view described here, the internal state consists of attention and motivational displacement. 
The activity of care is the activity of responding to needs. It i  possible to describe someone as 
‘caring’ and to mean that they have a caring disposition, that they are occupying the internal state 
of care or that they are performing care-giving or any combination of the above. The disposition, 
internal state, and activity need not arise together, but it often occurs that they do. For the care 




briefly describe all three concepts and what role they play in Noddings’s ethic and the care ethic 
I endorse in this thesis.  
All three concepts of ‘care’ are intertwined in actual practice. In particular, the internal 
state of care and the caring disposition are intimately connected. Noddings’s concept of caring-
for is a caring internal state. Specifically, caring-for refers to an internal state involving attention 
and motivational displacement (Noddings, 2010b, p.36). Unlike care theorists such as Michael 
Slote, Noddings does not make a claim that caring requires any particular affective state or 
feeling (such as empathy, in Slote’s case) (Noddings 1990; Slote 2007). According to Noddings, 
feelings like empathy, sympathy, and fellow feeling can be connected to the receptive attention 
and motivational displacement of caring-for. Noddings claims that these affective states may be 
generated by attention, may generate attention, or may generat  motivational displacement 
(2010a, p. 9-10). She never makes a claim that any particular feeling is necessary for caring-for. 
That is to say, in the view espoused here, the internal state of care can be connected to a caring 
disposition, but need not.  
Noddings calls the internal state of care when practiced out of the caring disposition and 
involving such affective states as love, affection, or inclination, ‘natural care’, and when 
practiced out of ethical will ‘ethical care’ (2010b, p.36; 2002b, p.29). Noddings claims that it is 
preferable that caring-for is “natural”—that is, practiced out of love, affection, or inclination 
rather than ethical will (2010b, p.36; 2002b, p.29). I agree with Noddings that it is preferred 
(although not required) that the caring disposition occurs along with the attention and 
motivational displacement of caring-for, giving rise to or arising from those states. A caring 




However caring-for can also occur without the caring disposition, involving the ethical 
will to do the right (caring) thing. She likens it to “a dutiful form of caring that resembles a 
Kantian ethical attitude” (Noddings, 2002b, p. 30). When we encounter people for whom we find 
it difficult feel empathy, sympathy, or fellow-feeling, the carer makes a “moral effort” and 
orients herself as if she cared (Noddings, 2010a, p. 11). In those situations there is no affective 
component bearing appropriate relation to attention and motivati nal displacement. Noddings 
calls the alternative a moral effort because natural caring-for occurs more spontaneously than 
ethical caring-for (although both may require reflection) (p. 11). 
I argue that “natural” caring—a form of caring that does not require an ethical effort to 
motivate it (although it may require considerable physical and mental effort in responding 
to needs)—is developmentally prior to and preferable to “ethical” caring. Ethical caring, 
when it must be summoned, is properly aimed at establishing or rest ring natural caring. 
(Noddings, 2002, p. 2) 
 
Other theorists such as Joan Tronto (1993), do not take a stance on whether natural caring 
has more moral value than ethical caring. I agree with Noddings that natural caring is the type of 
caring that is preferred for the care ethicist. Below I introduce several examples to illustrate how 
Noddings understands the relation between the caring internal state and caring activity, as well as 
ethical and natural caring-for.  
Let us consider two paradigmatic types of care: mothering and nursing. We can bring to 
mind the mother who has both a caring internal state and is performing caring work. If her child 
scrapes a knee, she empathizes with her child’s distress, feeling distress herself. Both the 
affective and practical components are present in this example. Perhaps if the mother is annoyed 
with the child, after all the child was playing where they weren’t supposed to when they scraped 
their knee, she will go through the motions of caring for the scraped knee—but the mother will 




We can also imagine the nurse who provides care for patients, but does not have a caring 
disposition. That is, the nurse wants to see the needs of her patients met, but her attentiveness to 
those needs is not because of empathy or a similar state.  
Instead, her attentiveness might be motivated by a desire to be good at her job, to be 
efficient at care-taking, or even just a desire for her patients to be well. The important point to 
understand is that whatever her internal state is toward her pati nts, it is not one motivated by a 
caring disposition. This could be for any number of reasons. She might think she is a better nurse 
if her focus is unencumbered by a caring disposition. Alternatively, she might be worn out from 
a long and trying week and is just unable to summon that disposition of care for her patients. In 
both examples, the mother and the nurse do the caring work, even though their internal states of 
care do not at that moment involve the affective states of a caring disposition. Noddings states 
that it is our memories and understanding of what it means to care that we draw upon when we 
care in these situations (Noddings, 2002b, p. 29).  
Noddings does not have a name for that third possibility; having a caring disposition but 
not performing any caring activity. In some cases this may be a moral failure, and in some it may 
not be. We might think: the care ethicist has made a commitment to care, so why aren’t they 
acting upon their caring disposition? Our attention is brought to the reality human suffering 
frequently; just consider any time you glance at a newspaper, the internet, the TV or listen to the 
radio. We are inundated with calls for help from media and other sources. We notice suffering 
closer to home in our communities, work or school: homeless p ople begging for change or food, 
upset children in the park, exploited employees, bleary-eyed suburban parents carpooling hordes 
of kids, and so on. We notice people suffering, feel for them, but never move beyond feeling 




However, if we describe all of these instances as moral failings we are saying that the carer 
should respond to all expressions of need that they come across. Responding to each and every 
need is not required of the care ethicist. In fact, Noddings say  that attempting to respond to 
every need is impossible and undesirable (p. 48). I return to this problem later in this chapter, 
when talking about evaluating care in Section 3. 
Needs 
We’ve talked about the concepts of caring relation, care and caring, but have yet to 
address needs although they play a central part in caring. Identifying needs, deciding which 
needs are legitimate, adjudicating between needs, deciding how best to attend to them, and then 
attending to them make up the bulk of the carer’s caring work. The practice or activity of care is 
attending to needs. In order to attend to them, we must be able to iden ify and respond to them 
(Noddings, 2002, p. 53). The recognition of needs is termed attention/at entiveness.  
First, this concept of needs does not refer only to necessities for survival; needs can arise 
from wants and desires and we still call them needs (although this does not obligate a carer to 
treat them all the same). Noddings discusses needs in conjun tion with personal projects. I agree 
with Noddings that personal projects are an important part of selves. Carers may find themselves 
concerned with endorsing projects based on the needs they anticipate stemming from projects; or 
rejecting certain needs because they pertain to projects that the carer does not endorse. For an 
example of the former, a partner in a relationship might not endorse the other’s project because 
they anticipate the project will generate a future need to move. An example of the latter would be 
a parent rejecting a need for a guitar or guitar lessons because they do not endorse their child’s 




We can divide needs into two categories: expressed and inferred. Those needs that the 
cared-for expresses—through conscious and purposeful communication (e.g. language), or 
through behavior that is conscious (e.g. getting in line for fo d) or unconscious (e.g. stomach 
rumbling)—are considered expressed needs. Inferred needs are not express d by the cared-for. 
Instead, they “proceed[] from the carer’s framework” of what the cared-for does, or should, need 
(Noddings, 2002, p. 64). These are often related to social, cultural, and similar goals. Noddings 
mentions immunizations and regular medical check-ups as examples of needs that our society in 
general infers that children need (p.63). Young children do not express a need for either of these, 
but their caregivers infer the need in order to protect the child from harm. The primary 
distinction between the two is that expressed needs originate in the cared-for, and inferred needs 
originate in the carer. 
Sometimes expressions of need will be clear, such as asking for resources, at other times 
expressions of need may be unclear and the carer will have to interpret them. In the cases of 
individuals that are severely handicapped and not able to communicate, Noddings would likely 
ask after other indicators of their needs (or perhaps, of any harms) and ask how can we attend to 
those needs and protect from harms. A very young infant my express all biological needs in a 
similar manner (crying), but an older child may verbalize them. In the above discussion I 
mentioned stomach grumbling as an expression of need. We might want to say that we actually 
infer this biological need: if I hear my partner’s stomach grumbling, I infer that he is hungry. 
However, this inference is from the biological grumbling exprssion that originated in my 
partner. This would not properly be an inferred need since it still arose internally in another. To 
avoid confusion, I use ‘interpret’ in place of ‘infer’ to pick out expressions of need that must be 




Let us return to actually inferred needs, though. I gave examples above of needs that our 
society generally picks out for young children. Doing so for young children seems less 
problematic than for older children or adults, which might be regarded as paternalistic. For 
example when our parents grow old, we may infer a need for them to move in with a care-giver. 
We can imagine that the cared-for may resist going along with the inferred need. As children 
resist (sometimes fiercely) inferred needs like getting shots, the elderly may also resist inferred 
needs like assisted living which require giving up their independence and privacy. Noddings 
does not think that coercion is a first step in attending to inferred needs. Rather, if fulfillment of 
inferred needs is met with resistance the carer should exp ain and negotiate with the cared-for if 
possible. If explanation and negotiation are not possible, or the carer deems the satisfaction of 
the need necessary even though the cared-for does not want i , coercion can be appropriate. 
However, use of coercion is always cause for reflection. Noddings cautions that acts of coercion 
should arise out “of responsibility toward the cared-for” not as “artifacts of power and 
expedience” (2002b, p. 228). Finally, when the carer deems coercion necessary, they express the 
basic caring attitude, “I am here,” and respond to distress as positively as their “resources and 
moral evaluation will allow” (p. 234).  
Just because needs are inferred or expressed, however, does not mean they should be 
fulfilled (Noddings, 2002, p. 68). The care ethicist must judge which needs should or should not 
be fulfilled. Additionally, when needs conflict, the carer must decide which if any wins out. A 
child may express a need to stay home from school, while the parent infers a need for the child to 
attend. In this relation, the parent as carer must judge whether the child’s expressed need wins 




the child’s expressed need to stay home. However, if the child wants to stay home in order to 
play video games, the parent might judge that need should nt be fulfilled.   
The cared-for can respond to non-fulfillment of a need in ma y different ways. Noddings 
thinks that cases where the cared-for responds with “But you just don’t care!” are some of the 
most difficult for the care ethicist, requiring the most skill and patience (2002, p. 42). 
Particularly when such occurrences repeat over time, the carer may need to reflect on whether 
the way that they are dealing with the situation is ideal. Going back to the example above, in 
such a situation the parent might ask the following: Does th  child not like the school or 
instructors? Do they not have enough recreation time at home? Is the child addicted to certain 
recreation, like video games? Ideally the carer and cared-fo  can come to a compromise that 
works for both parties. Noddings does not assume these efforts are easy, but she does think they 
are ideal in a care ethic.   
It becomes clear very quickly that attending to needs is a complicated and potentially 
hazardous activity for the ethicist. What happens if we fail to identify a need? Or identify the 
wrong ones? How do we properly adjudicate between needs? These discussions are found in 
Sections 2 and 4, where I discuss in more detail how the care ethicist ideally identifies and 
attends to needs.  
Section 2: The anatomy of caring relations and caring encounters 
In Section 2 I explain Nodding’s phenomenological definition of caring encounters and 
relations that captures “how we are when we care and when we are cared for” (Noddings, 1990, 
p. 123)—see pages 9-10 for the full definition. Caring encounters and relations involve an 
internal state, caring-for, caring activity, recognition f care, and possibly response. This section 





As I said above, Noddings defines caring-for as in internal state characterized by 
attention and motivational displacement. As she describes it, when we are caring-for our 
experiences are compelling, strong, and instantaneous. Attention i volves a realization of 
another’s existence; an “aha!” moment that gives you a glimpse into another’s reality. 
Motivational displacement is a state wherein we are motivated to see another’s needs or projects 
fulfilled, even if just for a moment.  
Attention 
 According to Noddings, attention is when we se another person; not just passively 
acknowledging their being there but allowing that fact to “seize our consciousness” (p. 17). Such 
a moment is often marked by feeling another’s pain or need—as we “receive what-is-there” in 
the other (p. 18). With this eeing comes recognizing the other person’s needs and their goals or 
projects. Noddings’s language regarding the phenomenology of attention is akin to having an 
ecstatic religious experience10—and perhaps it isn’t so remarkable to think that recognizing a 
human being in herself might be close to a divine experience. In such an experience we imagine 
a self submersed in awe of the divine. Similarly, in a state Noddings calls “pure attention,” the 
self is emptied and “becomes a duality… see[ing] through two pairs of eyes, hear[ing] with two 
sets of ears, feel[ing] the pain of the other self in addition to [her] own” (2002, p.15). This level 
of attentiveness is probably not achieved in reality, as according to Noddings attention is “always 
a fragile condition subject to distraction or rejection” (p.15). The circumstances under which 
pure attention might occur may not exist in most peoples’ realities.  
                                               





Many of us have a natural tendency toward passively taking in the world as we wander 
through it. Noddings’s care ethic asks us to break out of that pattern of passivity and to 
understand that others are not just figures in the foreground of the play about ‘me’, but that they 
have their own existences. This attention (or just receptivity as it is called by others, such as 
Tronto) is a skill in which we may have varying degrees of ability (Noddings, 2002, p. 16). We 
may find it easier to do so for those we are more connected to—whether by social or cultural 
position, physical proximity or other reasons. As a first-grade teacher, I may find it easier to 
experience attention for younger students, but might struggle mor  with students in age groups I 
don’t often deal with. I also may be more attuned to my family member’s mannerisms and so 
pick up on their states more easily than someone who is a stranger to me. Thus, it may be more 
difficult to enter this internal state when encountering those with whom we have little in 
common, such as if we are separated by culture, age, gender, or race.  
We may also experience the opposite problem, since in this moment of attention, “our 
initial self is vulnerable, and it will be changed by this encounter” (p. 15). This can be 
problematic if it is too extreme. This vulnerability means that one runs the danger of “losing 
themselves” in the other. Sometimes people can become so enmeshed with another that their 
identities seem to blend; the individuals who are enmeshed cannot understand where one begins 
and the other ends, a state known as ‘engrossment’.11 Here, engrossment is a pathology 
precluding one’s capability to care. 
We may also find our ability to enter this state blocked by conditioning, exhaustion, or 
ignorance (willful or not). Living in an area with many beggars, we may condition ourselves to 
                                               
11 In her earlier work, Noddings used ‘engrossment’ to describe attention — in a positive way. However, since the 
mid-eighties the negative connotation of this word and its use in criticism of her work led her to adopt the more 





just not see them. We notice their physical presence, but are careful to not enter into the 
receptive attention state, usually out of a desire to not feel for them or to perform a caring act. 
Perhaps we seek to avoid awkward, difficult, or distressing encounters. Or, if we normally care, 
perhaps walking home after work we are too exhausted to notice anything about them other than 
their physical presence. We may choose to remain ignorant f those around us by not making eye 
contact, walking fast and keeping our heads down in public places, thus avoiding attention. We 
could also be ignorant of those around us if we are in a new location, with a different standard or 
style of living than our own—behavioral and social cues that helped us in familiar places might 
not be helpful in others.  
It should be noted that although properly attention “receives what-is-there” in another, it is 
very possible that we do a poor job of it. We may project our own understandings, either 
misinterpreting what-is-there or making up what-is there. Or, we may miss a key element of 
what-is-there.  
Motivational Displacement 
Then, “if A is sympathetic to B’s plight… motivational displacement follows on the heels 
of attention” (Noddings, 2002, p. 18). Motivational displacement is when “A’s motive energy 
begins to flow toward B and his projects” (p. 18). Without some obstruction, attention naturally 
gives rise to motivational displacement; what it is to receive another in themselves is to then 
understand their desires, wanting to see them fulfilled. However, just because the carer takes on 
the desire for the fulfillment of the cared-for’s needs or projects, this state of consciousness “tells 
us nothing about what A will actually do or should do” (p. 18). That is, just because we 
recognize and even sympathize with someone’s needs does not mean we will or should endorse 




inferred need, but ultimately judge that resources are unavailable or that the need isn’t as 
important as originally thought.  
Noddings gives an example of a teacher who stands behind her student “as he struggles to 
solve an equation. Ms. A can almost feel the pencil in her own hand. She anticipates what B will 
write, and she pushes mentally toward the next step, making marks and erasures mentally” (p. 
17). Here, the teacher experiences motivational displacement and endorses the project of the 
student. Alternatively, Ms. A might see B happily reading a book from home, and Ms. A smiles 
knowing the joy reading brings B, especially as an alternative to struggling with math. However, 
B is supposed to be working on math problems during math class. In this case Ms. A, while 
experiencing motivational displacement towards B, will not endorse B’s project of reading. As 
the teacher in charge of B’s math courses, Ms. A is responsible for B’s learning math and so may 
think B is better served using that time for math practice than reading.  
In some cases motivational displacement may be blocked, for example we may be repelled 
by another’s project and therefore be unable to feel motivated to see it completed. For instance, 
the social worker responding to a claim of child abuse may understand the teen who wants to 
stay with their parent (experiences attention) but maynot be moved to allow the teen to stay 
(motivational displacement) because the social worker knows that according to the laws and 
policies, as well as his own gut, he needs to get the teen out of the situation.   
 Together, attention and motivational displacement make up “caring-for”, an internal state 
of being oriented towards fulfilling another’s needs. They typically happen instantaneously, and 
for one who is more skilled in or disposed towards caring, happen with little or no effort or 
special energy. In a caring encounter, the carer next judges wh ther or not to endorse and act 




Recognition and Response 
Since Noddings has a relational view of care, it is necessary for her to include the cared-for 
in her definition of caring encounter/relation. For her thee is a worry that leaving out 
consideration of the cared-for’s recognition and response in the definition comes at the risk of 
giving too much power to the carer, making an already unequal relationship more unequal. In 
addition, the cared-for is really “the site of initial ‘vibrations’” (Noddings, 2002, p. 15). It is the 
need of the cared-for that starts the sequence of caring, not the carer’s recognition of that need. 
Along these lines Noddings (and other theorists such as Joan Tr nto) argue that any 
conceptualization of care that does not give adequate attention to the cared-for is inadequate for a 
care ethic.12 
The recognition of A’s caring by B completes a caring encounter (Noddings, 2002, p. 19). 
Noddings does not require that this recognition, which she also refers to as “reception” (p.19), 
necessarily be cognitive. She includes young children, animals, and infants in the category of 
beings whom we can properly care for, meaning those beings are capable of 
recognition/reception. In a section entitled “Our selves and other selves: Bodies”, Noddings 
(2002b) describes parents that respond to their infants cries with touch such as caresses, holding, 
rocking (p.129). For the infant, they experience the touch, motion, or warmth in response to their 
cries. For Noddings, the physical experience of respon e to the infant’s needs counts as reception 
here.  
Without recognition of A’s caring by B, the caring encounter would not be a two-way 
street. Only A would know that they acted to respond to B’s need. B would receive something 
that fulfilled a need, but without any connection to another person. If the goodness in caring 
                                               




relations is linked to its affirmation of our interconnectedness, then fulfilling needs without 
connection isn’t an example of the relational care. In this situation, B’s experience of the care 
would be as if it was provided by an automaton, devoid of human interaction. For Noddings’s 
care ethicist, mechanistic fulfillment of needs absent human interaction is missing the 
fundamental good of life—that interconnection between human beings that is caring relations. 
Certainly, it is better for B than not having any needs responded to. And A, for her part, is 
affirming interconnectedness by deciding to respond to the needs of B. But if A remains 
anonymous from B, A is not fully acknowledging the connection between herself and B. 
Furthermore, A is preventing B from experiencing the affirmation of their connectedness.  
There are many examples of how B’s needs can be attended to, but without affirming 
interconnectedness. For example, let us say B is elderly, with reduced mobility, and lives in an 
assisted living facility away from family and friends. If there is a robot who provides for all of 
B’s needs, then we can say that B’s needs are being responded to. However, we would not, in the 
parlance of a care ethic, say that B is being cared for. Even if B likes the robot, even if the robot 
improves B’s quality of life, this is still not an example of B being an object of care. There is no 
affirmed connection to other human or living beings in the int ractions between B and the robot.  
Let’s consider another case in which B receives care (they have a need responded to) and 
recognizes the care (that a need is being responded to), but does not recognize the particular 
individual giving the care. That is, B recognizes that some individual is responding to their need, 
but B does not recognize that it is due to A’s efforts. B’s rooms are cleaned when she is asleep, 
perhaps her meals are prepared when she is watching TV. B will never be able to recognize A’s 
efforts, or respond to them. This may be frustrating for B, since B cannot praise or complain in 




to the other person. In those cases, it is clear that B would be better off having the connection 
with A and that without that connection B is not being properly cared for.  
If B is unable to recognize that it is a person A that responded to their need, then B has no 
ability to respond to A. B is unable to contribute to the encou ter. Both B and A are missing out 
on important parts of life: B is unable to thank or complain to A; A is unable to receive thanks or 
complaints and grow in their caring ability. Additionally, such encounters do not contain a 
connection between individuals. In the second example, the effort flows in one direction, from A 
to B. In this situation, all of the moral effort is A’s, moving the focus of moral understanding to 
the carer and away from the cared-for. This is problematic for a care ethic that has a relational 
perspective. 
In a caring relation, recognition is followed by response from B which both parties use to 
adjust the relation as needed. In a caring encounter, it is not necessary for A to receive a response 
from B, although it is ideal. B can respond to the care in any way they desire, even angrily. 
According to Noddings, ideally the response is one “that contributes to another’s capacity to 
relate, to work, to sustain caring” (Noddings, 1990, p.123). Such a response needn’t be verbal, it 
could be other vocalizations or body language.  
Recognition of care or response to care does not require equality or mutuality. It also does 
not mean that it is necessary for the carer and the cared-for to feel the same thing in a caring 
encounter or relation. In mutually caring relationships it may be the case that both parties do, but 
in unequal relationships like that of a parent and child it will often not be the case. In fact we 
might think it a poor relationship if the child cares for theadult in the same way the adult cares 




Section 3: Caring- For vs Caring-About 
For the project at hand, it is important to get clear on the relationship between caring 
directed at those close to us and those distant from us. If Noddings is correct that: a) caring-for 
and caring-about are distinct internal states, b) caring-for has more moral worth, c) caring-for is 
directed at those close to us, and d) caring-about at those distant from us; then it seems the 
relevant questions the carer will have about the food chain will be about whether or not people in 
it are close or distant. After determining that answer, it is a matter of the carer inhabiting the 
right internal state toward the other. However, if it isn’t so cut and dry that we always and only 
care about those distant from us, and care for those cloto us, then the carer is going to have 
different questions about how to approach these situations. This section analyzes how Noddings 
understands this relation between caring-for and caring-about. I argue that her characterization is 
flawed, and I present my own.  
Paradigmatically, caring-for is directed towards individuals clo e to us in terms of 
distance, chains and circles of caring, and culturally and socially. This type of caring is typically 
characterized by a strong affective component, and by resulting in an action or activity that 
directly responds to the recognized need. For example, a mother comforting a child who has hurt 
themselves and attending to their wound. The other type of caring is caring-about, typically 
directed towards those individuals distant from us physically, in chains and circles of caring, and 
culturally and socially. This type of caring still has some affective component, but typically it is 
thought to be felt more weakly, more briefly and to result in action that indirectly (usually very 
indirectly) contributes to the recognized needs being attended to. An example of this would be 
seeing a commercial for an non-governmental organization that serves youth in another country 





Noddings has not developed as thorough a description for caring-about as she has for 
caring-for. She does not provide a phenomenological description of caring-about, nor has she 
spent much space developing the concept.13 She is however clear that caring-for and caring-
about are distinct concepts, and lead to distinctly different caring activities. Noddings’s 
distinction between caring-for and caring-about rests on the following factors: 1) distance 
between the carer and the object of care, 2) the quality of the internal state of care, and 3) the 
type of caring activity generated by the internal state of care. I argue that none of these 
distinctions, either alone or together, can fully account for caring-about and caring-for as 
separate and distinct concepts. In my view caring-for and c ring-about are paradigmatically as 
Noddings describes them, but not necessarily that way. Below I give several examples of how 
Noddings’s characterization fails to hold up.  
First, let me summarize Noddings’s view on the two concepts. Encounters with 
proximate others can involve caring-for, a strong internal state that gives rise to a caring activity 
which directly attends to the needs of the other. Caring encounters with distant others involve 
caring-about, a weaker internal state that gives rise to caring activity which indirectly attends to 
the needs of others. So between caring-for and caring-about, the objects of care are different 
(distant rather than proximate), the internal state is different (the carer is not moved to be 
attentive to the same things, to be motivated in the same way as she would be if the objects of 
                                               
13 Over the years, Noddings’s view on the moral worth of caring-about has shifted. She described it as a moral 
failure in her 1984 book, and then later in 2002 said that is instrumental in ensuring the flourishing of caring-for. 
Even though she has moved to revalue caring-about, her initial stance in 1984 has informed her decision not to 
spend much time developing the concept. She has given several reasons why she has not spent much time on it: 1) 
Caring-for is ethically and developmentally primary to caring about, so focusing on the more basic caring-for is 
necessary before worrying about the secondary caring-about, 2) Noddings views her work on the care ethic as more 
rooted in caring practice than theoretical exercise, thus s e often sidelines conceptual discussions which she thinks 




care were proximate), and the caring activity is different (activities that promote conditions to 
allow caring-for and caring relations to occur, rather tan directly caring-for the object of care).  
For Noddings the quintessence of caring-about is a recognition of and turning of the heart 
towards the needs of those distanced from each other: people on different sides of the same town; 
Americans and sweatshop workers in a far off country; or suburbanites who shop at groceries 
and the migrant farm workers who help stock those groceries. Each may acknowledge the other’s 
need and affirm it, feel for them, and then donate to a charity or participate in political action or 
cast a vote. However they do not perform caring actions for each other directly, nor do they have 
a chance to recognize the other’s caring about them. In this view we are caring about when “we 
express our care in charitable gifts, in the social groups we support, and in our voting” (p. 22).  
In Noddings’s view (and here I agree), caring-about is an extension of the internal state of 
caring-for, i.e. it is a “fellow-feeling for others” that we tend to have “if we have been well cared 
for and have learned to care for a few intimate others” (Noddings, 2002b, p.22). The moral 
development of the carer involves first being cared for, then learning to care for others, and 
finally learning to care about others. Thus, caring-about is secondary to caring-for in moral 
development. Those who never learn to care for will never l arn to care about. Conversely, those 
who care about must already know how to care for. She claims this is because caring-about is 
aimed at individuals whose relation with ourselves does not exist in reality, but in our 
imagination only. “The extension outward from already existing caring contexts to potential 
relationship is the result of our ability to imagine such relationships based on our own past 
experiences” (Keith, 2007, p. 253). We use our experiences and memories of caring-for to 




to care for those that they encounter, will care bout those they encounter that they cannot care 
for directly (Noddings, 2002b, p. 22).  
For Noddings, the distinction between caring-for and caring-about is important for 
several reasons. As was discussed above, the fact that different types of encounter lead to 
different activities is important. In addition, their status as distinct concepts is important because 
in her theory caring-about is morally less important than caring-for, developmentally secondary 
to caring-for, and potentially dangerous to fully realizing the fundamental good (caring relations) 
in the world. Both caring-for and caring-about aim to establish, enhance and maintain caring 
relations, but the former does so more directly than the latter. This is because when we care for 
another, this interaction results in caring encounters and possibly caring relations, whereas when 
we care about another it does not so directly result in promoting the fundamental good (i.e. 
caring relations). This does not mean however that caring-bout is necessarily bad in Noddings’s 
view. Caring-for and caring-about can work in concert, or be in t nsion with one another. At its 
best, “caring-about can help in establishing, maintaining, and enhancing [caring for]” (Noddings, 
2002b, p. 23). Our political activities like voting and protesting can help the conditions for 
caring-for. At its worst, caring-about is “a moral failure”; we mistakenly think that by caring 
about we are living up to an ideal of a caring character, while neglecting the work of caring-for 
(p. 113). In cases where we should care for another, but we only care about her, we are not doing 
our best as carers.  
Analyzing Nodding’s View 
Having described Nodding’s view on the distinction between caring-for and caring-about, 
I move on to analyze this distinction. Noddings and I differ n the understanding of what 




Noddings’s distinction seems to be a function of some of the qualities of encounter. Noddings 
tells us that caring-about is directed towards “people who are at a distance from us in terms of 
social status, culture, physical distance, or time,” and caring-for towards those close to us (p. 3).  
Encounters of those types lead to certain internal states, nd then certain activit ies: she describes 
caring-for as motivating “direct, face-to-face caring” and caring-about as what happens we 
cannot be bodily present, motivating the creation of principles that indirectly “enable others to 
undertake” caring (p. 3). If Noddings is correct in her conceptualization, we would think that it is 
not possible to care directly for a distant other. In this section I provide several examples that 
show this is not the case. 
One of Noddings’s suggestions, that it is physical proximity or distance that is key to 
caring-for versus caring-about, is exemplified in the following: Noddings states that it is possible 
to turn caring-about into caring-for by ‘receiving’ the problem, and bringing the person into 
proximity whereupon the other becomes “my proximate other and must be met as cared-for by 
me, one-caring” (Noddings, 1984, p. 113). She gives the example of a teacher who claims to care 
about her student that struggles with mathematics. To transform the caring-about into caring-for 
the teacher receives the problem, understands it from the student's perspective, and brings the 
student into physical proximity, such as by inviting them to her office (p. 113). For the teacher, 
the student goes from being one of many students, to being an dividual in themselves. 
Noddings uses this example to show that physical proximity is important to caring-for. The 
caring-for is less likely to have occurred in the large format classroom—it would have been 
harder for the student to express their need, and for the teacher to be attentive to that need. In this 
case, the other factors of distance (culture, time, etc.) are absent, isolating the effects of physical 




Moreover, the teacher in this example does not meet th student personally only to better 
understand the problem. That would be helping the student perhaps, but that would not be caring 
for the student. The teacher might want the student to get the answ r or to be able to understand 
the problem, but not because she is experiencing motivational displacement for the student. She 
isn’t motivated to help the student with this for their own sake, but perhaps just as part of her job. 
In Nodding’s view, the physical proximity triggers caring-for, by putting the carer and the cared-
for face to face.  
I think that the physical distance helps caring-for occur, b t I do not think it is the key 
factor Noddings suggests. Instead, I think that what is important here is that the teacher and 
student encounter one-another as concrete individuals in their own right, minus the layers of 
abstraction present in the teacher/student classroom interaction. The teacher encounters the 
student as a concrete individual only when they are brought into a setting away from the 
classroom and the other students. In the classroom, the stud nt may just be another voice, 
another one of the young pupils. In the teacher’s office, the student becomes an individual with 
their identity and narrative distinct from the other students. The student also encounters the 
teacher away from the mediating circumstances of classroom formality. The student can express 
their need to the teacher, who is able to face the student without intervening trappings. Now, this 
encounter could happen in the classroom. It is just much less likely. It is more likely that one-on-
one, face-to-face, these individuals encounter one-another directly. Conversely, the student and 
teacher could fail to encounter one another as individuals in the teacher’s office. The teacher 
could continue to only meet the student as just another student, rather than as a concrete 




As shown in the example discussed above, it is not physical distance alone that blocks or 
facilitates caring for another. The teacher and student in the example above could have a caring 
encounter in the classroom, it is just less likely. Consider a further example: We could 
conceivably care for our spouse when they are on a business trip. We can attend to their 
emotional needs in conversation by telephone or video. I think most experiences suggest that this 
kind of care is of lesser quality than the care we receiv  or give face-to-face. Thus, we say when 
we are distanced from our loved ones and need their care, “I wish you were here, or I was there.” 
It seems there is something important about proximity itself for the best caring. Still, though, it 
seems we would want to describe such a situation as caring-for. I can encounter my significant 
other as a concrete individual, be attentive to my significant other’s emotional needs over the 
phone, be motivated to see them met, and attend to his needs by speaking words of comfort and 
encouragement. Thus, at the very least it is possible to maintain a caring relation over physical 
distance, and to respond to needs with care.  
 Further I think that it is also possible to establish caring elations over a physical distance. 
Modern communications can allow us to encounter others directly even over physical distances. 
For a case of establishing caring relations or having caring encounters between distant others that 
are not already in a relationship we can look at experiences of those working with suicide 
hotlines, or those who respond to expressions of need in online forums. In an online forum 
community, such as reddit.com, it is not unusual for members cloaked by anonymity to respond 
to expressions of need such as posts about depression or anxiety. Some of these encounters are 
very brief, such leaving a text post saying, “It will get better.” Alternatively, users report that 
people reach out to them through the private messaging system and send long, thoughtful 




Noddings’s care ethic, I think we would also describe this as caring-for. Although the encounter 
occurs between strangers and online, the carer experiences attention and motivational 
displacement towards a concrete individual, and is moved to respond to the needs of the object of 
care. 
 In both situations above, I was discussing a limited range of n eds, emotional needs, and 
one type of distance, physical. We cannot through video-chat hold a cool cloth to a fevered brow 
or feed our children when they are hungry. Despite that fact, it doesn’t seem to be the case that 
physical distance is the key differentiating factor in caring-about and caring-for. Certainly, 
physical proximity seems like it might help generate caring-for as opposed to caring-about. 
Conversely, it seems like physical distance does functio as a barrier in many cases. However, it 
is not always the case that either does so. Thus, this factor can’t be what differentiates the objects 
of caring-for and caring-about. 
 Similarly, I think some of the other conditions she gives are barriers and facilitators to 
caring-for, but never absolute conditions on caring for. I include here social status and culture. It 
is possible for people to care for others across social and cultural distance; it is perhaps harder 
however. Our attention may be flawed; we may find it more difficult to notice needs. Or we may 
find it more difficult to experience motivational displacement towards people unlike ourselves. It 
is not, however, impossible. Noddings also includes time in her list—time, however, is an actual 
barrier to caring for. We can only imagine individuals in the past or the future, and extend our 
internal state of caring towards them via imagination. There is no encounter with these 
individuals other than in our imagination, and there is no possibility for activity of caring across 




individuals whom we only meet abstractly. In both cases w  extend our caring to these 
individuals through imagination.  
 So, if we are able to care for others across distance, so ial status, and culture, then 
Noddings’s conceptualization falls apart. If we can care for those physically distant from 
ourselves, then it cannot be physical distance alone that differentiates the objects caring-for and 
caring-about. I didn’t claim that these types of distance are unimportant, only that there are not 
sufficient for making this distinction. 
My View 
 In my view there is another concept operating here for which all the factors of distance 
that Noddings mentions are barriers and facilitators. I mentioned it earlier and I will say it here 
more clearly: I think that the abstractness versus concreteness of the object of care is what 
actually distinguishes caring-for and caring-about. In some aspects, this is in line with 
Noddings’s theory: when we care for, it is usually for those concrete individuals who are 
physically proximate, socially and culturally close to us, close in time, or face-to-face. When we 
care about, it is usually about those abstract individuals who are physically distant, socially and 
culturally removed from us, perhaps distant in time, or not face-to-face. When we care for 
concrete individuals, we are likely moved to act in a way that responds to their need directly. 
When we care about abstract individuals, we are less likely to act to respond to their need 
directly, and more likely to act in a way that supports another doing so. The difference is whether 
we are responding to a particular ‘concrete’ person, or an ‘abstract’ social role or description.  
 Noddings herself gives an example that illustrates this well: 
A personal story may help to illustrate my point here. Some years ago, when my 
husband and I had added to our family by adopting Asian American children, a colleague 
commended us, but then remarked, “But, of course, adoption is not the answer.” He 




I responded with some irritation, “Well, it’s the answer for these kids.” Now, on 
reflection, I think we were both partly right. There is no adequate substitute for caring-for 
(direct caring)—of this I am convinced—but intelligent, conscientious caring-about can 
suggest ways to extend caring-for to many more recipients. (2002b, p. 23) 
 
The carer, faced with an individual concrete child, will care for the child’s need and 
respond directly, for example, by adopting the child. However, th  carer faced with the abstract 
child who needs to be adopted, may be attentive to and motivated to respond to the problem by 
creating policies and institutions that makes it so that such children don’t end up in that situation 
in the first place. Unlike Noddings, however, I don’t think these are distinct and separate: the 
abstractness or concreteness of an individual in encounter is experienced on a spectrum. At one 
end, we experience the other as more concrete and at the other end as more abstract. It is more 
likely that at the concrete end of the spectrum, what comes to attention and what we experience 
motivational displacement towards looks more like what happens in Noddings’s caring-for: this 
is the end of the spectrum she inhabits when she decides to adopt the child. It is the child, as an 
individual with a need for a home, family, and love that Noddings’s responds to. At the other end 
of the spectrum, when we encounter the other abstractly, the needs that come to our attention and 
the motivational displacement we experience look more like her caring-about: this is the end of 
the spectrum her colleague inhabits when he suggests a grand solution is needed for the children. 
It is the child, as an abstract individual, one of many children who needs a home, family, and 
love that Noddings’s colleague responds to. 
 However, even at the concrete end of the spectrum there will still be some degree of 
abstraction. We never encounter the other completely unabstracted. At the abstract end of the 
spectrum, there will be some particularity. There must be something particular about the 
individual or individuals that we respond to. The concrete indiv dual we are more likely to ask 




less likely to ask after. Consider that a more abstract individual may be one about whom we only 
know their needs (for example children who need to be adopte). We may know about them but 
not actually know them, and in such a case we are less likely to notice some of their needs that 
can’t be easily inferred from general knowledge about their situation. When attentively receiving 
someone on the concrete end of the spectrum, we will be mor likely to notice how they deviate 
from abstract norms regarding their person or situation. That is because we are paying attention 
to their individual characteristics, and receiving them as an individual in their own right, rather 
than letting stereotypes, social cues, and other shortcuts do the work for us. 
 In between either end of the spectrum we encounter others in the messiness of human 
relation. Our caring encounters and relations won’t always look like Noddings’s paradigms. 
Communications technologies and social media in particular have enabled us to interact with 
others in a variety of ways. For example if I follow a celebrity on twitter, I might care for them 
and be attentive to their needs and experience motivational displacement. I may want to see their 
needs met, but it is highly unlikely I will ever be in a situation where I will respond directly to 
their needs. The celebrity may never encounter me at all, even though I follow their life closely. I 
might tweet at them “Hang in there!” if they are having a bad day, along with five hundred other 
fans, and the only response is a pic with “xoxo thanx love my fans!”. This sort of example is not 
paradigmatic caring-for or caring-about. None of the typical facilitators for caring-for are 
necessarily present: physical proximity, cultural or social similarities, but I encounter the 
celebrity concretely, I experience attention and motivational displacement, and I respond directly 
to their need. Telecommunications and social media have changed the efficacy of the barriers 




 These new ways of communicating, however, don’t change some things. It is likely that 
my response gets lost amongst hundreds of similar responses. And the recognition of my effort 
and the response is indirect. So even though I have the state of caring-for, there doesn’t seem to 
be any real chance of establishing a caring relation or even having a caring encounter. So does it 
make more sense to think of this as an example of caring- bout? This doesn’t seem to be an 
example of caring-about—my internal state looks more like caring-for, the person I’m attentive 
to and experiencing motivational displacement towards is moreconcrete than abstract—but nor 
does it look like that paradigmatic example of caring-for where the carer and cared-for encounter 
one-another face to face.  
 When it comes to these kinds of cases, I don’t think it does the care ethicist any good to 
try to torture the definitions of caring-for and caring-about into capturing all the permutations of 
human interaction. Thus, I think it makes more sense to understand the paradigms of either 
concept as growing out of encounters occupying a spectrum. If we understand caring-for and 
caring-about as ends of a spectrum, then we cannot draw a distinction the way Noddings does. I 
still agree with Noddings that it is caring-for resulting  caring encounters and caring relations 
that is what the care ethicist should aim at. How do we know, though, when we are caring for 
another? I think it is evidential if the cared-for would respond that they think the carer is doing 
so. In the above example about adopting a child, if the child is old enough to understand and 
verbalize the issue we can imagine them saying that Nodding’s colleague doesn’t really care for 
her. She might say, “Yes, he cares about kids who needs homes. But, if he really cared for me, he 
would also want to adopt me.” If we are capable of recognizing when people deviate from 
assumed norms and stereotypes, this is also evidential that we are closer towards the caring-




 Noddings’s adoption example also illustrates the vices and virtues of each. Caring-for 
typically results in direct response to a need. However, this may come at the cost of the larger 
picture. Unfortunately, the carer exists in a world that is not already a caring utopia, and must 
contend with structures that discourage care, make it difficult, or make it impossible. Ideally, the 
carer would like a world in which structures facilitated and encouraged care, or at the very least 
always allowed care. In our world though, it might be ethically inadequate if the carer only ever 
acts on caring-for. In such a world it is beneficial for the flourishing of caring relations that 
carers act on caring-about as well. In the example above, they may work to provide better 
education, healthcare and support to women of childbearing age, their partners, and their 
communities. They could also work to improve adoption processes, foster homes, and so on. So 
caring-about can be useful in that way. It is dangerous, however, if carers in this world do not 
move beyond caring about—it is only by caring-for that caring relations are created. Without 
caring relations, we are missing out on the fundamental good. It is likely, though, that those who 
care for a child and adopt them will also care about children needing adoption.  
 At this point, the reader may wonder if I agree with Noddings that caring-for is morally 
preferred to caring-about. A carer who only ever exhibited one or the other would probably not 
be exhibiting a truly caring character. Both caring-for and caring-about are internal states 
affirming the basic tenet of a care perspective—that we are interconnected beings—and both 
motivate us to respond to the needs of others we are connected to. Both are instrumentally good 
as well, because they contribute to caring encounters and caring relations. Caring-for is morally 
preferable because it more directly connects concrete people together. Connecting to abstract 
others is not the same as connecting to concrete others. The latter is more important for and 




 Earlier in this chapter I said that if we care for, but avoid letting the cared-for know of 
our efforts to respond to their needs, then we are failing in affirming our interconnectedness. I 
pointed to the one directional nature of this sort of activity as the reason why. At this point, it is 
worth asking whether and how that is different from the on -way affirmation of caring-about, 
which is generally directed an individual or individuals who will never know of the carer’s 
efforts. I think it is actually similar. The reason why caring-for has more moral worth than 
caring-about is that when we act on caring-for and it results in caring encounters or caring 
relations, we are creating connections with other individuals and affirming our 
interconnectedness. When we act on caring-about, we are usually only supporting other people 
making such connections. We ourselves are affirming our own interconnectedness to others in 
the web of care, but we are not communicating that to the object or objects of care.  
However, it is morally problematic when the carer cares for another and avoids 
recognition and/or response, while it is not morally problematic in the case where the carer cares 
about another. When we care for, it is for an individual we encounter concretely, and when we 
act on that internal state we typically respond directly to their need. If it is possible to allow 
recognition and response, and we avoid it, then this is a moral failure. For example, let’s say that 
E is relatively well off in her community and wants to do something charitable for the new year. 
E knows that there is an elderly woman, G, in her knitting crcle who is on a fixed income and 
sometimes has trouble making ends meet, including paying for heat during the winter. If E 
anonymously pays for G’s winter heating bills, then E is failing to fully affirm her 
interconnection with G. E might say when asked that she donated anonymously to spare G’s 
feelings, so that G wouldn’t be embarrassed, or even E might say that she doesn’t want to be 




the relation with G by preventing G from feeling indebted. Because we live in a culture in the 
United States where self-sufficiency is valued, it may be difficult for G to explain that she needs 
help with the heating bill. However, E may not know for sure what G’s thoughts and feelings are 
about the matter. In this situation, however, E could be making an unequal power dynamic more 
unequal by preventing G from finding out it was E who made the donation. G is powerless to 
respond positively or negatively, and is prevented from helping E grow in her caring. It is 
possible that after finding out her heating bill has been paid for, G really wants to thank the 
person who made that effort. In that situation then E and G’s caring relation is prevented from 
developing as well. This example is complicated, but the care ethicist is going to come down on 
the side of allowing recognition and response.  
We can also imagine a scenario, though, where E sees adv rtisements reminding people 
that those on fixed incomes may struggle to pay heating bills during the winter, and that people 
can donate or get or help for those in need. In this case,E cares about those abstract people 
mentioned in the advertisement, and acts to help them by donating to the outreach program. E is 
supporting the outreach program which responds to the needs of people who can’t afford their 
heating bills. There is no specific person who is the object of E’s care who is being deprived 
affirmation of interconnectedness. For the people who receive assistance, and in this scenario 
let’s say G is one of them, they will know they are receiving assistance and that people and 
corporations have donated to help them, but it wouldn’t be possible for them to know what 
person in particular helped—because it wasn’t just one person. It was many. So, G will know 
that her needs were responded to, in this very diffuse way. She might feel happy that people in 
her community came together to support people like herself in a time of need. G could also be 




need this kind of support in the first place. In this scenario, however, we can’t point to a 
particular moral failing in the failure to affirm interconnection between E and G.  
The problem of when caring-for versus caring-about is appropriate is discussed in the 
following section, on evaluating care. This section discussed and analyzed Noddings’s view on 
the distinction between caring-for and caring-about. I argued that her conceptualization does not 
hold up, and that the two concepts are best understood as differing in terms of how abstract or 
concrete the carer-for is when encountered. I return to this discussion in the next section to talk 
about how caring-about can be evaluated, and how the carer properly balances caring-about and 
caring-for.  
Section 4: Evaluating Care 
Thus far, this chapter has focused on introducing and analyzig the care ethic and the 
component parts of caring: caring relations, caring encounters, caring-for, and caring-about. In 
this section, I discuss what evaluative claims can be made within this care ethic and how we go 
about doing so. In order for me to make the case in Chapter 2 that the care ethic can provide 
useful insight and guidance for individuals in the food system, and structural critiques of the food 
system, I need to give an account of how we evaluate people, efforts, relations and the structures 
surrounding care. In the first part of this section, I revisit the assertion that this care ethic is 
consequentialist and get more specific about the moral force f obligation within the ethic. I 
answer questions about our ability to make evaluative judgements about caring as theorists. I 
also explain how carers guide their own ethical actions with any ability. In the second part of this 
section, having explained theoretically how we can judge, I describ  how we go about this in 
practice. I give explanations for how we coherently judge individuals and their efforts carers, as 




Stepping Back: How do we evaluate? How do carers know what to do? 
For the care ethic to be useful in the real world I think we should expect a few things 
from it. First, we need an account of how people are able to guide their own ethical efforts. 
Second, we need an account of how we can judge when those effrts go well or go wrong. This 
is a complicated discussion because Noddings’s theory and my own have features similar to 
consequentialism, virtue theory, and particularism and thus some of the same challenges.14 I start 
this explanation by returning to discussing how the care ethic is consequentialist.  
Noddings says and I agree that “at bottom … care theory is consequentialist ... It asks 
after the effects on recipients of our care. It demands to know whether relations of care have in 
fact been established, maintained, or enhanced, and by extension it counsels us to consider 
effects on the whole web or network of care” (2002b, p. 30). The care ethic is not 
consequentialist in terms of some narrower definitions: it i  not agent neutral; and the moral 
value of an act does not depend solely on its consequences. I say not solely because efforts that 
positively affect the web of care and carers, but are not made in step with a caring character, 
cannot be said to be truly caring. For example, it is not possible to create an algorithm that 
predicts the most care-generating response in any particular situation and use that to guide one’s 
actions while not cultivating a caring character. If one’s efforts in caring are divorced from the 
internal states of care, then one cannot be said to be acting ethically within the care ethic. The 
care ethic is consequentialist, however, in that it is not e ough to have good intentions in our 
caring efforts. It is not an objective or subjective consequentialism either: if our efforts as carers 
are to be morally good they must actually be successful. The overall effect of one’s efforts on 
                                               
14 Virtue Theories or Virtue Ethics are theories of morality that explain moral rightness in terms of virtues or moral 
character. For more information please see Hursthouse (2012). Moral Particularism is a type of moral theory that 
denies the existence of moral principles, and emphasizes the variability of the relevance of details of moral 




caring relations in the web of care is the criterion by which we judge what is morally right or 
wrong. 
Noddings emphasizes the consequentialist nature of her care ethic, but also holds a very 
context-sensitive view of care. I think this context-sensitivity has led some of Noddings’s critics 
to misunderstand the moral force of obligation in her ethic. While I respond in more detail to the 
substance of Garland’s case against Noddings in Chapter 2, I want to touch on his claim that 
Noddings’s version of an ethic of care fails to “establish an obligation to help strangers in distant 
lands” (p. 181). In short, he is correct. However it is not for the reasons he gives in his argument, 
but because the care ethic does not generate any specific obligations that we can theoretically 
derive external to the context of a particular situation between particular people.  
The care ethic is not actually particularist, because it has at least one general principle: to 
respond to expressions of needs with the basic attitude. That principle generates general 
obligation for the carer, but exactly what response is appropriate is highly context-sensitive. It is 
for that reason, the context-sensitive nature of the car ethic, that I say it faces some of the same 
problems as partaricularist theories. Caring involves responding to needs, but what needs or 
whose needs should be responded to cannot be derived from principle. This view rejects the idea 
that responding to needs can be reduced to attending to hierarchies of needs such as those put 
forth by Martha Nussbaum or Amartya Sen.15 Instead, it is the particular details of the situation 
and those involved that determine what or whose needs should be responded to.  
So in a Noddings-style care ethic, obligation is not externally derived from theoretical 
principles. Instead, it is an internal “I must” that arises in those who have developed practical 
wisdom in caring (2002b, p. 52). We can generalize when it is likely appropriate that this sense 
                                               
15 At least one care theorist, Joan Tronto, actually does think that incorporating a hierarchy of needs such as those 




of “I must” should arise, and when it is inappropriate. However, there will always be exceptions, 
and the particularities and messiness of the situations we find ourselves in in actuality may not 
benefit from armchair theorizing. To guide their actions, carers develop practical wisdom that 
guides their ethical actions. Those less-developed may find their care goes wrong more often, 
whereas those more-developed may find it goes right more often.  
This is very similar to the Aristotelean notion of phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom. It is not 
an innate knack, it is developed over time while practicing care and observing the world around 
oneself. The carer uses this practical wisdom to judge whenne ds should be met, how needs 
should be met, how to maintain caring relations in the fac of negative response from the cared-
for, and so on. Ideally this happens jointly with a well-developed capacity for attention and 
motivational displacement. And again similar to the Aristotelean notion, it is expected that 
children and adolescents are less likely to have practical wsdom and thus are not usually 
culpable for failures of such, while adults are.  
Even in a particular situation and context it is not pssible except if one is a moral saint to 
make definitive evaluative judgements before acting concerning which actions may be right or 
wrong. An individual carer may have a sense of obligation, but her practical wisdom could fail 
her in how to fulfill that obligation. Or, in someone whose practical wisdom is not well-
developed, they may fail to feel a sense of obligation when t y should. Even ex post facto, it 
may be difficult if not impossible to discern what a right or best course of action in any particular 
situation would have been. At this point, the reader may then question how any care ethicist has 
the ability to guide their own ethical actions.  
There are certainly many ways that we can go wrong in applying our practical wisdom. 




displacement.  We may feel rushed or busy, we may be emotionally exhausted, we may be 
distracted, or we may fear the obligation resulting from attention. If we call upon our capacity for 
attention, motivational displacement may arise and then obligation towards the object of care. 
The activity of care is not always easy and may be physically, mentally, and emotionally taxing. 
Thus we may sometimes purposefully avoid calling upon those capacities. We may also 
sometimes fail to receive in attention any expressions of eed due to our lack of familiarity with 
a context or other ignorance. Further, among different p ople and even in the same person over 
time our level of practical wisdom and capacity for the int rnal states of care may vary. It is the 
case that some people never develop the capacity for care. However, in a Noddings-style care 
ethic, in order to do good, the capacity for care and the practical wisdom to respond to needs is 
necessary.16  
So when Noddings or myself use the term ‘obligation,’ what we really mean is what a 
carer with well-developed practical wisdom and the capacity to care would perceive as an 
obligation in such a situation (unless otherwise noted). These obligations, though, are never fully 
generalizable to specific instances of all such situations. By that I mean that within the care ethic, 
if in a particular situation one violates a generalizable o ligation, this would not mean they have 
necessarily committed a moral harm. There could be particulars of a certain situation that 
rendered the generalization moot. However if one violated an obligation derived from principle, 
this would mean they committed a moral harm. In the rest of the paper, then, when ‘obligation’ is 
                                               
16 I acknowledge that there may be criticism of a theory that requires a capacity that not all people have. Further, 
there may be questions of whether is it even possible for all people to have this capacity. While this is an interesting 
debate, I do not have room to address it in this thesis. Studies do show that individuals of both genders develop a 
capacity for care and can access it at different ages, but for more information please see Noddings (2002b), Gilligan 




used it refers to the above-mentioned sense of obligation. We can generalize what obligations for 
certain people may be in certain situations though they won’t be absolute.  
To someone like Garland, however, it is still true that the car  ethic does not obligate us 
to distant strangers, but that is because such a general concepti  of obligation is just incoherent 
for the care ethicist. Garland and the care ethicist are going to be at cross purposes here: He 
claims that the inability to have a general conception of obligation deems the care ethic 
inadequate. The care ethicist is likewise going to criticize any ethic Garland would endorse for 
not being sensitive enough to the particular details of any situation. 
If you accept the above discussion, then at this point I have given a general account of 
how, theoretically, evaluative judgements can be made about carers in the care ethic. In the next 
part of this section I describe the content of judgements about carers. That is, I provide the tools 
to make evaluative judgements about the particular cases we look at in Chapter 2.    
Evaluating Individuals and Structures in the Care Ethic 
In a way, making judgements about individuals and structures in the care ethic is a 
curious effort. The care ethic is most concerned with what happens in relation between two 
individuals. The moral worth of our efforts is derived from what happens between two 
individuals. I think it is important, however, to give an account of how the care ethicist goes 
about evaluating both individuals and structures. First, each of us only has control over our own 
personal efforts.17 Thus, I think it is valuable to describe how we judge those individual efforts. 
Second, each of us lives in a complex global society where many structures, both abstract and 
physical, interact to determine, at least in part, the shape of our lives. Since these structures 
                                               
17 Indeed, some individuals may not have control over theiown efforts. I have in mind young children and infants 
and people with severe mental handicaps. I think the case can be made to include others in this category. While the 
care ethic is capable of addressing judgement of these individuals, and it is important to include them in our moral 




influence our lives and especially our encounters and relations with other people, I think it is 
important to discuss what critiques the care ethic may be able to generate about these structures.  
In order to guide the discussion in Chapter 2, here I explain what sorts of efforts and 
judgements are usually good and usually bad in caring. We know that our caring efforts should 
achieve a certain effect—but what kinds of efforts in the real world usually achieve that? There 
are many component parts of caring and many different ways of positively affecting caring 
relations in the web of care. Caring involves the internal state of caring, adjudicating needs, 
acting on caring, and then the recognition and/or response of th cared-for to the carer. This can 
happen when we care for or care about another. Then I talk about what obligations carers have 
and the role of the web of care in determining those obligations.  
Understanding all of those are necessary for understanding how we evaluate individuals 
and structures. These explanations are woven together. We already have in hand our criteria for 
evaluating individual’s ethical efforts, but it is useful to understand how and where they have 
gone wrong. When it comes to evaluating structures that effect our caring efforts and the web of 
care, we are concerned with structures that are barriers and facilitators to care. Structures that 
usually or always block care are going to be bad, and those that usually or always facilitate care 
are going to be good.  
Ideals of Caring  
Internal States of Care 
 The internal state of caring involves attention and motivational displacement. The 
internal state that arises in response to concrete others is caring-for, and towards abstract others 
is caring-about. Paradigmatically, caring-for “seizes the consciousness” and has a stronger 




directed towards abstract others, is an echo of the care we direct at those we encounter concretely 
generated by our imagination.  
Earlier I explained and agreed with Noddings’s view that attention and motivational 
displacement can involve affective states like empathy, sympathy, or fellow feeling in several 
ways. She terms this natural care. When we have to summon these internal states out of some 
ethical motivation and that caring disposition is not present, this is ethical care. Specifically, it is 
the internal state of care that is natural or ethical. In my view, the internal states of caring-for and 
caring-about can both be either natural or ethical. For both, the internal state is ideally natural. In 
encounter, ideally our attention would pick up on whatever is important whether expressed or 
inferred. Then we would be motivated to respond to the needs brought up in the encounter.  
 There are two reasons for preferring natural caring over ethical caring, and thinking that 
natural caring is superior in promoting the fundamental good that the care ethicist seeks to 
promulgate. First, ethical caring is often inferior to natur l caring in terms of directly creating, 
maintaining, and enhancing caring relations. Second, if thecar d-for discovers that the carer was 
motivated ethically rather than naturally, this could be damaging to the caring relation.  
When it comes to those we encounter concretely, ethical caring is useful when a member 
of a caring relation cannot summon natural care—p rhaps even a caring relation can be 
generated by the encounter in which activity to meet needs is motivated by ethical caring. 
However, if the cared-for recognizes that the carer’s efforts are ethically motivated this can 
damage the caring relation. For example, if my significant other comforts me when I’m sad but 
he seems slightly distracted or I just don’t feel that we are connecting I might accuse him of not 
really caring for me right now. We are usually upset and may even feel betrayed when we find 




can perhaps restore the relation by explaining why they act d out of duty rather than inclination. 
So if my partner tells me he was just exhausted, and apologizes, I may feel this explains why he 
acted in a way that did not affirm our interconnection in the right way. However, if we summon 
ethical caring too often, it will likely become apparent. The cared-for may become disheartened, 
embittered, or spiteful. In addition the carer can be damaged by summoning ethical caring too 
often. If the ethical caring is dissonant with their carer’s actual emotional state, this especially 
can have negative outcomes (Ben-Achour, 2015; Kiely, 2008). In both cases we see that 
emotional caring can create problems in the caring relation that are different than if we cared 
naturally.  
For those we encounter abstractly, we might think it matters less if we are naturally or 
ethically motivated. Paradigmatically, we encounter these oth rs in ways that do not allow for 
recognition or response. If the cared-for cannot recognize how we are motivated, we might think 
it doesn’t matter. We might even think it makes sense to care out of duty for abstract others and 
save our emotional and psychological resources for those we ncounter concretely. For the care 
ethicist, however, it is going to matter whether or not the car d-for is aware of what is going on. 
Caring out of duty is an inferior way of affirming our interconnectedness and interdependency in 
comparison to caring out of inclination and affection. Moreover, if we strategize to reserve our 
emotional and psychological resources for a certain set of people as a means to an end this also 
reflects unconcern for others. So while you might make the case that it is more expedient to 
ethically generate care towards abstract others, this is not n the spirit with the care ethicist who 




Noddings likens ideal natural care to a virtue.18 It is a skill that we learn as children, and 
individuals seem to be more or less skilled at caring for others and receiving care. Those who are 
more skilled may find it easy to care naturally for others. Those who are less skilled may need to 
more often summon ethical caring. Ethical care may also need to be summoned when one is 
experiencing compassion fatigue. “Compassion fatigue occurs when a care-giving relationship 
founded on empathy potentially results in a deep psychological response to stress that progresses 
to physical, psychological, spiritual, and social exhaustion in the family caregiver” (Lynch & 
Lobo, 2012, p. 2125). At the point of exhaustion, the caregiver may feel numb, unable to produce 
the motivation necessary to care naturally. However, he may still be able to care ethically, doing 
what he would do if he were to care naturally.  
Attention & Motivational Displacement  
Whenever the internal state of care involves a caring disposition, the carer may find it 
easier to experience the internal state of care. This may be especially true for motivational 
displacement—if an affective state such as love or empathy accompanies or is generated by our 
attention to one we encounter, then that affective stat could help propel motivational 
displacement. This will not always be the case though. Attention and motivational displacement 
have several factors that may make them more or less successful.  
Attention is part of the internal state of caring-for or caring-about. For most of us it is a 
skill that needs to be nurtured. Self-absorbed people are particularly poor at attention, they “seem 
never to develop the capacity for attention” (Noddings, 2002b, p. 17). There are also some 
people who are particularly perceptive of and sensitive to others’ needs. Ideal attention receives 
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virtue, not virtue one among many; and 2) Caring starts with a dyad (the carer and the cared-for), not with a “lone, 




the other as an individual in their own self, recognizing their needs in their own context. This 
includes not assuming that people in other communities are opeating with the same value set as 
we are; so, not requiring they have the same standards, fix their problems in the same way, or 
have the same obligations.  Moreover, ideal attention will pick up more in an encounter than 
what is overtly expressed. At the most concrete end of the spectrum, ideal attention is the pure 
attention I described earlier. At the abstract end of the spectrum, there is less input to receive 
attentively. Consider that there is a huge difference in encounter if I interview a survivor of a 
natural disaster face-to-face versus if I read excerpts of someone else’s interview with the person 
in a magazine. And yet more difference if I don’t encounter the individual at all, but only an 
abstraction of them as I read about the residents of the town devastated by the natural disaster. At 
the very abstract end of the spectrum, ideal attention receives whatever there is to receive, and 
then we rely on our imagination to supply further input to generate a picture of the individual(s).  
The skill necessary to be good at receptive attention to someone you encounter 
concretely, face-to-face, is going to be slightly different from that necessary for being good at 
encounter of abstract others. In the case of the former, we need to be able to interpret body 
language, tones of voice, and other social and cultural cues that go beyond what is overtly 
expressed. It is important that the carer is able to pick up on needs that may not be verbally 
expressed. Noddings describes an encounter of a professor with a younger student; the student 
came to ask a few questions—and unbeknownst to the older man—to help decide whether or not 
to commit suicide (2002b, p. 17). The man responded to what the student was asking, but failed 
to pick up on anything else. The man and Noddings offer this as an example of a failure of 




needs directly expressed in the encounter. Both Noddings and the man believe that if the man 
had been more receptively attentive, he could have picked up onmore in the encounter. 
When we encounter someone abstractly, this can be because the medium of encounter 
abstracts the individual or it can be because we ourselves use cultural and social paradigms to 
abstract the individual. Sometimes we use cultural and social paradigms expediently to enhance 
understanding of a situation. Sometimes it can be damaging to our ability to respond with care to 
the other person. Those carers who are more skilled will be less likely to use cultural and social 
paradigms and have it result in harm. If it is that the medium of encounter abstracts the 
individual, and there really just is a limit on what is available to our attention, the carer needs 
skill in understanding the context of the medium. This could mean knowing, for example, that 
what someone decides to put on social media may not reflect the whole of their thoughts or 
experience. Or it could mean understanding that a liberal tlevision network may have a certain 
bias in reporting. Our attention when we encounter others abstractly combines knowledge of the 
medium of encounter, cultural context, and other inputs withhatever is overtly expressed in 
encounter to create an image of the abstract other(s). Additionally, the carer should not presume 
to have encountered the other concretely when they have not. The carer is ideally aware of the 
limits of their attention, and takes that into consideration when deciding how to respond to what 
arose in encounter.  
When it comes to motivational displacement, the ideal is that motivational displacement 
immediately arises out of attention, propelled by some affective state or states. While this may be 
true especially for those we encounter concretely who may be more likely to general a caring 
disposition within us, it is not always the case especially for those we encounter abstractly. When 




displacement because it is too hard or too big. Noddings describes this saying, “I look right at the 
sufferer, but I admit that I can do nothing further” (Noddings, 2010a, p. 12). In such cases, we 
may have to summon our sense of duty or ethical will to propel that flow of motive energy 
towards the object of care.  
While Noddings claims that natural caring is preferable to ethical caring, she does 
acknowledge that “there are limits to what one carer can do… we cannot care for everyone... To 
suppose that we can or that we ought to is a lovely but wild dream” (2002b, p. 48). The care 
ethicist, having made a commitment to be a caring person, ideally responds with natural care 
whenever possible, summoning ethical care when needed.  
Adjudication of Needs 
The internal state of care is just the first part of a caring encounter or caring relation. 
Carers must also adjudicate needs and respond to them. The carer does not always fulfill 
expressed or inferred needs. Sometimes the caring response to a need is to affirm “I am here” 
and explain why you cannot or will not fulfill the need. The carer thinks there are some needs 
that we should not meet. Our obligations in the web of care describe how would should 
adjudicate needs.  
Fully, our obligations are determined by “personal capacities, the nature of regular 
encounters in a particular life, and the complexity of one’s own web of caring” (p. 51). 
Noddings, like many of the authors writing on care, take into consideration the fact that there are 
limits to our caring capacities—physical, mental, temporal, etc. These limiting factors are one 
aspect determining our obligations. Practical wisdom in caring would suggest that we are not 
blameworthy for failing to respond with care when we do not have the resources. Another aspect 




complexity of our web of care; whether it is a certain profession, personal obligations of family 
and friends, or other. The care ethicist’s obligation is to respond (remember, not necessarily 
fulfill) to what arises in encounter—and although one may not be morally blameworthy for 
failing to do so if there are limiting factors, it is still he case that one is failing to live up to 
caring ideals.  
The web of care has an impact on our obligations becaus how we are connected to 
people in the web of care influences how we encounter them. For example, the circles of 
proximate others are often governed in part by rules, codes, r cultural norms that guide our 
interactions. In virtue of certain roles or relationship , we have certain responsibilities to people. 
We usually encounter those in our inner circle of care more concretely and those in the outer 
circles more abstractly. Noddings explains this by saying we hav stronger obligations to those 
closer to us in the web of care. In her view then, the lev l of obligation you have corresponds 
with how far removed someone is from you in the web of care. Often, this will correlate with 
how abstractly or concretely you encounter someone. I agree with Noddings to an extent, that 
our connections in the web of care determine our obligations. However I think she leaves herself 
open to allowing problematic parochialism.  
Given that we are interconnected in a web, in circles and chains, we are not connected to 
every other individual on the planet as a first order connection. Typically, caring-about is 
appropriate for those connected to us more distantly in the web of care because they are more 
often more abstract to us, and caring-for towards those morcl sely connected because they are 
more often more concrete to us. If we understand caring-about as being on a spectrum with 
caring-for, then one ethical worry is the case in which we are on one side of the spectrum 




should care for. As we move outside the inner circles of care, the regularity of our interactions, 
our special roles in our community and the particulars of the situations we find ourselves in will 
determine whether caring for or caring about is appropriate.   
However it becomes problematic for the carer if we relysolely on these roles to guide our 
actions as they can distort our attention or limit caring e counters and caring relations. The carer 
may sometimes want to refuse to conform to these roles. Thi  could be because supporting caring 
relations is better achieved another way. Another possibility is that those roles could be harmful 
to caring relations. A third possibility is that those roles r quire carers to act in ways that reject 
the truth of our interdependence. In those cases the care ethicist may decide to care for another 
directly when it is suggested they only have to care about. Or, alternatively, a carer may decide 
that being expected to care for another is inappropriate, unhelpful, or too burdensome and it is 
more appropriate to care about the other.    
But when should caring-about become caring-for? Whenever caring-about suggests a 
lack of caring attention or rejects the truth of our interconnectedness. If my neighbor comes over 
asking for help because their kid is having a medical emergency, if my only action is to 
recommend she call 911 and then donate to some sort of CPR education fund, we would think it 
a very strange and generally bad response. But even if I call 911, if I do nothing else, is that 
okay? I think that motivated by caring-about, calling 911 would be sufficient, but it might reflect 
that I’m not acknowledging the relationship between myself and my neighbor. She reached out 
to me for help. I should inquire later after herself and her c ild. I should go over and see if I can 
help until EMS arrives. I should sit on the curb and direct EMS to the house. In the former 
example, I am responding to a more abstract person, one who needs 911 called. In the latter 




In cases then where I care about people who are distanced from me in the ways 
mentioned above, should I ever bring them closer? As a carer develops a caring character and the 
practical wisdom that comes with that, they become better at judging when to do so. The carer is 
going to ask about why they are distanced. If it is on purpose, such as attempting to avoid 
encounter, this would belie the basic truth of the ethic. 
Similarly, relegating some individuals to do all the caring work while others take 
advantage raises the same problem for a carer. If we are connected to systems that disconnect 
people, or deny our connectedness, then this is problematic for he carer. People who are being 
exploited certainly do not feel connected in human fellowship to the people taking advantage of 
them. Or, if they do, we generally think there may be an underlying pathology. Taking advantage 
of or exploiting people goes against the basic truth of our interconnectedness. 
What about the reverse, it is ever appropriate to go from caring for another to caring 
about them? In many cases, if we care for someone, we are also motivated to do the kinds of 
things we would do if we only cared about. If I have an uncle with multiple sclerosis, I care for 
him as my uncle, but I also donate to multiple sclerosis-related foundations motivated by my care 
for my uncle. We generally think it is a failure of imaginaton when someone cares for a close 
family member or friend with a particular need, but isn’t sympathetic to abstract others with the 
same need.  
Sometimes we may make efforts to act on caring for some individuals and realize that our 
caring efforts were unwanted. Some friends of mine tried to start a tutoring program in a nearby 
suburb with underperforming and underfunded schools. These frinds are from the same metro-
area, but a different suburb. They were from the same socio-economic background as the target 




While they did have some students attend, they received a lot of criticism from the local 
community. The feedback was that my friends should have supported the efforts of a locally-
grown tutoring program rather than creating a new one entirely staffed by outsiders. Their efforts 
to care for concrete others were perhaps not the best use of their time and resources—and not the 
most effective or desired response to the community members’ needs. I think we can understand 
this as an example where caring for should be turned into caring about.  
All of this is in service to maintaining the interconnectedn ss - not just the existence of it, 
but people’s understanding of and belief in its importance. So if we care for someone, but they 
find it threatening or uncomfortable, we should back off and care about instead. If a caring 
relation is toxic, it should be changed or the relationship ended. It doesn’t mean that the actual 
caring goes away, it just means that our practical wisdom regarding how best to act on our care 
has changed. 
The contemporary carer lives in a complex global society, but with a limited capacity for 
care and limited resources. The capacity to care refers to the mental and physical capabilities to 
care. The capacity to care varies between lives and within lives—as we have more mental and 
physical energy and health we may be able to care more, and less when we have less. The 
phenomenon of ‘compassion fatigue’ is an example of the depletion of people’s capacity to care. 
If we are or become physically disabled, we will be unable to fulfill needs that require certain 
kinds of physical care. The business of our lives may leave us with more time to care for people 
at certain points and little or no time at others. We also have limited material resources to care. 





This is closely related to the ability to care which refers to the functional capabilities 
required to care: attention/receptivity to others, motivational displacement, caring action, and 
responsiveness. Children have to learn to care for others. Our ability to care will constantly shift 
throughout our lives as well. And as we get older and we have mor life experiences we become 
able to recognize needs in more places. Some of us will suffer abuse or other hardships that may 
close us off to the connection of caring for, diminishing our ability to care. If we convert to a 
religion whose tenets are in opposition to that of our parents we may no longer be able to 
experience motivational displacement with regards to our parents’ projects.  
A concern of feminist critics is that if we employ this ethic in a society where women’s 
capacity and/or ability to care is thought to be superior to men’s, that such an ethic would reify 
and legitimize structures that marginalize women. Noddings’s response is to agree that this is a 
concern, but to disagree that this means we should reject an thic of care—rather we need to 
work to revalue caring work and work for equality among genders. 
So in balancing obligation that arises in encounter and the restraints of limited resources, 
the care ethic judges a carer on whether they have done so i  a way that maximally supports 
caring relations through developing a caring character. When it comes to a carer’s efforts in 
supporting caring relations, they are best aimed at creating relations between people for whom a 
quality relation is possible. Thus often it would not make sense for a carer to try to turn caring-
about into a caring encounter if the object of care is abstracted in such a way that turning caring-
about into caring-for is difficult. The carer could get in ouch, could bring the cared-for into 
dialogue. In doing so both might become more concrete to one another. But that energy and 
effort might be better spent on supporting an individual more proximate and concrete to the 




Depending on the object of caring-about, it might also be the case that someone else more 
proximate and concrete to that individual really is better suited to enter into a caring encounter or 
relation. So sometimes acting on caring-about is the best you can do in response to an encounter 
of abstract others. In this case, we wouldn’t want to blame the carer for a moral failure for not 
turning caring-about into caring-for.  
To determine the overall best decision for a carer in any given encounter, or to evaluate a 
carer’s overall caring we would need some sort of caring calculus that could weigh the factors 
that the carer balances in making these decisions. As a theoretical matter, this is how we would 
judge carers and caring lives. Practically however, carers make these judgements having 
developed practical wisdom in caring.  
Activity of Care & Recognition and Response 
 There are several lessons about ideals in the activity of care, and recognition & response 
that we learn from ideal homes. One lesson I’ve already discussed at length: Caring activity is 
guided by the basic attitude of care, “I am here.” Nodding claims that in ideal homes parents 
affirm their connectedness to their children in expression of the attitude of care. Other lessons 
from ideal homes include that when attending to needs ideal homes also avoid benign neglect 
and paternalism and they don’t invoke negative desert (Noddings, 2002a, p. 443). Negative 
desert is the idea that someone deserves some kind of negative feedback as a response; whether a 
verbal reprimand, withholding of privileges, or other. At the same time, ideal homes sometimes 
employ coercion to make children do things that are good for them, even if they do not wish to. 
Noddings has less to say about ideals of recognition and response. She does think they are vital 
to caring—in fact, one of the reasons she thinks caring-for is superior to caring-about is that 




 I think that the role carers inhabit when they are cared-for also has ideals that our 
practical wisdom would guide us towards. Earlier I discussed that in receiving response the carer 
must constantly reframe and adjust their caring based on input from the cared-for and the details 
of the situation. I want to add that at the same time the car d-for has an obligation to respond to 
the carer. This is because it is reflective of unconcer  and denies our interconnectedness when 
we ignore or take for granted someone’s efforts to care for us. When we are cared-for, it is not 
always the ideal that our response is thankful. When a carer’s efforts to respond to a need miss a 
mark, ideally the cared-for expresses this to the carer. When power dynamics in a caring 
encounter or relation are very unequal, it may be necessary for the cared-for to respond in a 
dynamic or bombastic way to get their point across. Ideally, the response to care is given in such 
a way that it helps the carer. Sometimes our practical wisdom may suggest the best way to do 
this is kindly, sometimes it may suggest the best way to do this is with a harsh lesson that leaves 
the carer’s missteps in sharp relief. We may try to clarify what is needed, or critique how the 
need was attended to.  
 When response is not possible, recognition should at least occur. When we are cared-for, 
it is ideal that we recognize the other concretely who cared for us. When our needs are responded 
to by someone who cares about us, we should at least recognize the abs ract individuals who 
made those caring efforts. If we are unable to recognize when e are cared for or cared about, 
this could suggest a lack of well-developed caring ability and practical wisdom.  
Evaluation and Ideals 
So when we are valuating an individual’s efforts, we are asking whether they lived up to 
these ideals. Whether or not they are culpable for failures of care or harm to the web of care, we 




need because of neglect (blameworthy), or because of resourc  constraint (not blameworthy). 
Just because we are not blameworthy when our resources constrain u , however, does not mean 
that we necessarily doing our best as carers. Cultivating a caring character requires us to see 
resource constraint as a sad fact of the world that limits caring ability. Feeling relief at being ‘off 
the hook’ for responding with care might be a real reaction, but is not in line with an ideal caring 
character. While Noddings does not say it explicitly, she suggests that ignoring problematic 
issues because they are tough or because we feel powerless is not acceptable for the care ethicist 
(2002b, p. 212). 
When evaluating structures, we can ask whether they act as barriers or facilitators to the 
flourishing of caring relations. Similar to how the carer vi ws resource constraint (and some 
resource constraints may actually be structural features of the world we inhabit), carers ideally 
acknowledge the harmful impacts of structural constraints. We do not see them as letting us off 
the hook from caring, but as structures that tangle and tear th  web of care (2002b, p. 274).  As 
an example Noddings considers the care ethicist’s response to capitalism as a whole, which is a 
structure that some might claim creates a world in which it is impossible or very difficult to be 
good. Noddings says, “capitalism, like liberalism, has both positive and negative moral features. 
Rather than condemn it verbally and continue to live by it ecause we feel powerless to eliminate 
it, we should find ways to modify it.” (2002b, p. 212)). In this quote, we can see that the care 
ethicist tries to make the system one in which it is possible to be good. 
I haven’t explained how we judge each and every possible situation or structure—that 
task is practically impossible because the variability of the world is so great. I do believe, 




caring, what some of those judgements are, and how the care thicist guides their own ethical 
actions.  
Chapter 1 Conclusion 
 This Chapter described the care ethic being used in this thesi . I argued against 
Noddings's way of differentiating between caring-for and caring-about, and claimed that we 
should understand them as of a kind and on a spectrum rather than as completely separate ways 
of caring. I think her conception of the distinction is wrong because it relies on a faulty view of 
how we encounter other people, and my interpretation of the care ethic is more consistent with 
how we actually do so. I also clarified the moral force of obligation in the care ethic, and 
explained how care ethicists navigate making individual moral choices. In the final section of 
this chapter I described how we evaluate and judge individuals and tructures in the care ethic. 
  In the next chapter I defend this version of a care ethic against criticisms that it cannot 
generate global moral concern. I also argue that this version of a Noddings-style care ethic is the 
theoretically consistent way to understand issues of moral c ncern regarding our food supply, in 
opposition to a different suggestion from Deane Curtin. I show how we can analyze and 
understand harms and goods in the U.S. food system through a few select examples and use these 
to make the case that the care ethic can provide useful mora guidance for individuals and give 









In this chapter the discussion moves from theory to application. In the first chapter I 
explained and analyzed the key components of the care ethic. Now I apply the theory to the issue 
of the United States food system. I mentioned earlier that the literature is in disagreement about 
whether a Noddings-style care ethic can be useful in the public sphere, and if so of what use. 
Noddings herself has changed her stance on this issue between her earlier and later works: in her 
early 1984 work she thought it was of little or no use, in the 2002 work I’ve expounded upon she 
claimed the care ethic is useful for structural critiques of morally problematic social structures, 
and then most recently since 2010 she has said it should be paired with a justice ethic to be 
useful in the public sphere. I think that in the case of fo d ethics, the care ethic I’ve presented in 
this thesis does provide valuable guidance to individuals engaged in the food system and offers 
critiques and recommendations for the structures of the food system.  
An analysis of all aspects of the food system is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I 
have chosen a few examples to highlight some problems within the food system and how the 
care ethic addresses them. In the first section of this chapter, I critique and reject Deane Curtin’s 
argument of how a Noddings-style care ethic would connect consumers and producers of food 
and what ethical recommendations it would generate for food c nsumers. In the second section 
of this chapter, I respond to William Garland’s argument that a Noddings-style care ethic cannot 
generate global moral concern. I compare two coffee supply chains, and explain that while part 
of his argument is correct, the care ethic cannot generate robust positive obligations between 
distant strangers, this does not render the care ethic useless in making value contributions to the 




their consumer choices and how their actions would be judged in the care ethic. The third section 
of this chapter analyzes harms and goods in the food system that are sometimes obscured when 
discussion of ethical food revolves around consumption choices. I look at a few examples of 
labor abuses against migrant agricultural workers in the United S ates and responses to those 
abuses. I argue that currently there are labor policies and practices and market structures that 
make it very difficult for caring encounters to happen and caring relations to flourish in the U.S. 
food system. I then suggest one model that has been implemented in Florida for responding to 
these issues as an example of what a more caring labor structure would look like in the U.S. food 
system.  
Section 1: Responding to Deane Curtin 
Deane Curtin applied Nel Noddings’s early care ethic to issues in the food system, 
looking at what the obligation for a consumer in an industrialized nation was. Curtin argues that 
members of industrialized nations who have a choice in what they eat should make a choice to be 
moral vegetarians as carers. He claims that a particular hoice in the food system, eating meat, is 
uncaring and harmful and thus people with the capacity and resources to do so should be 
vegetarian. I think his attempts to apply a Noddings-style ethic to the issue of food ethics violates 
the tenets of the theory and introduces unfounded assumptions ab ut how harms work in the care 
ethic. Further I think his decision to focus on consumer decisions belies the very spirit of the care 
ethic; in his paper Curtin does not make reference to caring relations and caring encounters the 
way that Noddings envisaged them. You could talk about caring consumption choices without 
reference to those items, but then you wouldn’t be working with a Noddings-style care ethic.  
Curtin’s argument is captured in his statement that “one’s body is oneself, and that by 




violent by taking part in violent food practices” (p. 70). Elsewhere he echoes this saying, 
“personhood is embodied, and through the food which becomes our bodies, we are engaged in 
food practices that reflect who we are” (p. 71). Here he refers to the unnecessary eating of non-
human animals as well as the negative effects from factory and industrial-scale farming on 
humans in the United States and elsewhere. When carers’ food practices become connected with 
and benefit from harm, according to Curtin, carers are inculpated as part of the harm. 
His claims imply that a caring encounter is somehow transitive in the food supply chain 
for meat: an animal is harmed growing up on a factory farm, it is harmed when it is killed, 
people who work on those farms and are exposed to poor conditions and death are harmed by 
their exposure, and the meat that you eat carries that harm to you. You ingest the result of all of 
those harms and become part of the cycle of violence. The eater of meat is also personally 
harmed, because being part of a violent cycle is uncaring and thus unethical and harmful to the 
carer. Curtin then argues that those of us who can choose our diets should choose to be moral 
vegetarians, as we choose to opt out of being inculpated in harms and harmed ourselves.  
I think his argument isn’t valid in a Noddings-style care ethic. I don’t think that adding a 
transitive property (such as Curtin did to explain how meat eaters are inculpated in systemic 
harms) to caring encounters and caring relations is true to Noddings’s care ethic. For one, it is 
my opinion that she would not agree to such an understanding of ecounters. For an encounter to 
happen there has to be a meeting between a human being and another human being. We may 
encounter the piece of meat, in the general sense of encounter meaning ‘meet someone or 
something,’ but this is not the technical sense of encounter in the care ethic. Additionally, we do 
not necessarily in those ‘encounters’ of meat, come across or notice the associated harms as 




to this care ethic, for ‘encountering’ the piece of meat itself to bring to our attention any harms, 
there would have to be some mechanism by which encounters whein we become aware of 
harms are transitive through certain objects. There is no uch mechanism in any version of 
Noddings’s care ethic.  
I also don’t think we would want to introduce such a transitive property to a Noddings-
style ethic. Unless food is sui generis, then other objects would also be able to transfer encounter. 
This would mean that the used furniture I picked up at the second hand shop would engender an 
encounter between myself and the people who formerly used it. A ditionally, this would mean I 
am encountering all kinds of things by the transitive encou ter property that I have no way of 
knowing I am encountering. This would water down what encounter actually is. Further, it is in 
part the regular encounters in our lives that determine our obligations. If encounters of certain 
kinds can now happen unbeknownst to us, how will the ethicist be able to determine their 
obligations? It seems the carer would have the additional burden of worrying about the history of 
all of the objects and places they encounter. In terms of bringing clarity to the ethical theory, this 
move does not seem to get us anything very satisfying. But I also don’t think it is necessary to 
introduce such a property to generate moral concern between th  consumer of the meat and 
persons or beings harmed in the supply chain.  
My other concern with Curtin’s extension of Noddings’s care ethic is that it largely 
ignores the unique viewpoint of the ethic. Other authors, even those working outside the care 
ethic have made similar claims to Curtin. One example is Lisa Kemmerer, working outside of the 
care framework, who also argues that persons with dietary choice should choose to be vegan for 
reasons of animals, health, connections to oppressions, religion, and environment (2014). She 




choose a moral veganism. Curtin also comes to this conclusion, but while failing to draw on the 
fundamentals of Noddings’s care ethic. Curtin does not explain how the obligations of caring 
encounter and the balancing of the web of care come into play in understanding the carer’s 
ethical dilemma. While a care ethic might endorse a vegetarian or vegan diet, Curtin’s efforts are 
not successful in doing so because his basic understanding of the care ethic is wrong. 
I think his failure in extending Noddings’s care ethic to the issue of food consumption in 
part stems from his focus on decisions about consumption. I thi k it is common for discussions 
of food ethics to focus on arguments concerning consumers’ ethical obligations regarding their 
food consumption decisions. This is not to say that ethicis s don’t touch on other issues, but it is 
to say that I think this is one of the most prominent issue within the food ethic literature. It is 
from that lens then that ethicists investigate issues of whether or not we should eat animals, the 
ethical weight of organic versus local versus fair trade foods, bioengineering of food, food and 
health, food and culture, and so on. As I argue in the next section, the care ethicist is going to 
reject this approach.  
If when we say we are concerned about food ethics, we meanw  re concerned about the 
fact that our food system produces direct and indirect harms to people, other living beings, and 
the environment, then I think focusing on consumption decisions is the wrong place for the care 
ethicist to look to get at these pressing moral concerns. This is because the basic unit of ethical 
analysis in a Noddings-style care ethic is an encounter or relation between two people. When we 
make evaluative judgements in the care ethic, the ethical value of the judgements is always 
derived from the outcomes of encounter or relation. Food c nsumption decisions are not 
themselves the type of thing that is the basic unit of ethical analysis for the carer. Food 




encounter or relation. So, we could give an account of ethical consumption decisions as care 
ethicists. However such an account would not be the most direc way to analyze the issues that I 
think are actually of moral concern to those who say they ar  concerned with food ethics. 
Another approach to food ethics might be to ask, what makes food good? Well the care ethicist is 
going to say that food’s goodness is going to be derivative from its role in supporting caring 
relations in the web of care. Again, this is not the most direct way to approach the issue if what 
we are really concerned with are the harms generated in the food system. The more direct way is 
to look at the encounters and relations where those harms we are concerned with are being 
generated.  
This is why I have described this thesis as giving a new account of food ethics. I hope the 
work I have done here supports that food ethicists should focus n making ethical claims about 
the sources of harms in the food system, rather than on consumers’ obligations in the food 
system, or on describing what makes food good. This is also why I have described my efforts in 
this thesis as applying the care ethic to the U.S. food system. By pointing at the food system as 
the structure within which the issues of moral concern happen, I hope to draw our attention to 
people in relation to one another rather than to the individual making a consumption choice 
abstracted from their relations and encounters. That said, because ethical consumption choices 
are a popular subject in the literature I do address what the care ethic is going to say about them 
in the next section. In the third section, I present the type of analysis I think we should be doing 
as care ethicists concerned with harms generated from our food system.  
Section 2: Responding to William Garland 
On the other side of the spectrum from Curtin, William Garland (2000) argued that 




in the case of the meat supply chain) who are distant strange s, such as between the consumer 
and the producer end of a long food supply chain. He claims that caring relations are 
paradigmatically relations between two individuals who encou ter one another directly and 
cannot be understood in any other way. He argues that in a Noddings-style care ethic, the best a 
carer can do in regards to a person one does not encounter directly, is to be prepared to care if 
one does encounter them directly. Such an ethic cannot produce robust positive obligations 
between distant strangers. Garland’s point then is that if an ethic cannot produce global moral 
concern of that type, then it isn’t useful in the public sphere or for addressing such problems. If 
Garland is correct, then this care ethic does not seem like a good ethic to use to critique the food 
system.  
Garland’s concern suggests we should ask whether a care ethic is even the right ethic to 
use to analyze issues within the food system. Let me attend o each of his points in turn. First, he 
is correct in claiming that caring relations paradigmatically involve two individuals who 
encounter one another directly. But regarding his second claim, that the best one can do in 
regards to a person one does not encounter directly, is to be prepared to care if one does 
encounter them directly, I disagree. If by directly we can understand him to mean concretely, 
then in Chapter 1 I showed that carers both care for concrete others and care about abstract 
others and act on that care. In my version of a Noddings-style care ethic, carers are not parochial 
the way Garland suggests, barring them from considering acting in response to the needs of 
abstract individuals. While Noddings’s own version of the care ethic may be vulnerable to his 
criticism, mine is not.  
Garland goes on to argue that the care ethic does not then produce b st obligations 




then equates the ability to produce robust obligations towards distant others that we do not 
encounter directly to the ability to produce global moral concern. He concludes that Noddings’s 
care ethic cannot do so, and thus is not useful in addressing i ues in the public sphere related to 
global moral concerns. I argue that my Noddings-style carethic does not have that problem. 
While it is not able to produce robust obligations towards distant others that we do not encounter 
directly, it is still able to produce a global moral concern that guides carers’ actions in response 
to those distant others.  
In the example following this, I will show how that works out in the food system. If 
Garland’s argument can be interpreted to mean the care ethic does not obligate every U.S. 
consumer to create a caring relation with the people who grow, harvest, process, transport and 
package their coffee, then he is correct. In many cases, U.S. consumers are not positioned to do 
so. However, that does not mean that the care ethic generat s no moral concern or obligation 
between U.S. consumers and people involved in the U.S. food system.  
To focus this discussion, I will use two supply chain examples to refer to from Daniel 
Jaffee’s book, Brewing Justice (2007). His book includes case studies of conventional and fair 
trade coffee supply chains originating in the Rincón de Ixtlan in Oaxaca, Mexico. In this region 
all of the coffee producers are very small scale, family farms, distant from major trading points. 
These producers sell their coffee in one of three ways: to the conventional market through 
coyotes (middlemen), to the conventional market through the National Peasant Federation 
(CNC), or to the fair trade/organic markets through independent producer unions like the Oaxaca 
State Coffee Producers Union (CEPCO) and Michiza (p.81). For this egion, coffee is either 




conventional chain sold through coyotes and the fair trade and organic chain sold through the 
Michiza cooperative.  
In examining the encounters and relations in the two supply chains, I show that while the 
care ethic cannot generate a strong positive obligation between distant strangers (here end 
consumers of coffee and those involved distantly in the supply chain of coffee), engaging in 
certain supply chains as a consumer may be an ethical hazard in some cases, and a moral failure 
in others. I bring in a few other short examples to emphasize that last point. I think that if I can 
make the case for that, then I’ve shown that the care ethic can overcome Garland’s criticism and 
still be applicable for problems of global moral concern.  
Background on the coffee supply chains 
The coffee growers of the towns of Yagavila and Teotlasco in the Rincón de Ixtlan are 
much more likely to participate in the conventional supply chain than the organic/fair trade 
supply chain. Over three times as many coffee producers sell through the coyotes than through 
the organic/fair trade chains. These coffee producers, though, are all neighbors, and possibly 
fr iends and relatives. They choose for various reasons to produce and sell their coffee in different 
ways.  
The conventional supply chain 
The conventional supply chain lacks transparency. The coffee producers in the Rincón 
would find it nearly impossible to know in what country their paticular coffee is consumed. 
Likewise, consumers of their coffee would find it extremely difficult to find the source of the 
coffee beans they drink. This is because the farmers in the Rincón sell their coffee to coyotes, 
who then sell it to a warehouse in a trade center. In this case that trade center is Oaxaca City. It is 




shippers to consuming-country importers, distributors, and eventually retailers - grocery stores, 
local markets, and coffee shops, each of which takes a profit along the way” (Jaffee, 2007, p.78). 
If the coffee is sold to large coffee brands like Nestlé, the coffee beans from the Rincón will be 
blended with beans from around the world before being packaged, distributed and sold. It is 
possible that your Nestlé instant coffee bought in the United States contains product from the 
Rincón.  
The farmers who sell into this supply chain are less knowledgeable than the cooperative 
about market prices and world price fluctuations, and they have less bargaining power in their 
prices than others. The price and conditions for the coyote to buy their coffee is set by whatever 
price the coyote gets at the main market, and so on up the chain. Upon interviewing a coyote 
who regularly buys from farmers in the Rincón, Jaffee says “He [the coyote] admits he doesn’t 
know what the ‘official’ price of coffee is or how it is set”… ““He only knows what they tell him 
at the warehouse in Oaxaca City that buys his coffee, where ‘they screw me over good’” (p. 78). 
We see, then, that the farmers are part of a chain of individuals who are not empowered with 
knowledge of the market prices or how the market works, reducing their bargaining power. In 
years when coffee prices dip down, the producers in the Rincón may make very little or no profit 
even though they have put in the time and effort to produce the coffee. 
The fair trade/organic supply chain  
The coffee producers who are part of the Michiza cooperativ grow fair trade organic 
coffee. In the Michiza group, they have regular meetings and training sessions where members of 
the cooperative teach other members how their prices are set, what the world prices are, and how 
costs and price fluctuations get passed on to member producers (p.82). Most of the producers 




showed that over a period of 5 years, incomes from coffee production rose more for the Michiza 
cooperative members than for the conventional supply chain members. The payment structure of 
the cooperative also means that families who are members get payments throughout the year, 
ensuring injections of cash even outside the harvest season. This gives these families a safety 
cushion in that vulnerable time of year. It is not without its drawbacks, however. The organic 
coffee is more expensive and labor intensive to produce and requires a long-term commitment to 
the cooperative organization as well as to the farming methods. The membership of Michiza 
claims though that the benefits of belonging to the organization extend beyond high monetary 
remuneration. One individual working with Michiza from the beginning, Father Renteria, 
describes that people have gained better social consciousness, education in financial issues, and 
links to broader indigenous movements (p. 89).     
Michiza coffee has a much shorter supply chain, and a much ore transparent supply 
chain. The cooperative has control over the product until it is sold directly to a fair trade buyer. 
These include roasters like JUST Coffee Coop in Madison, WI. The roasters then sell their 
product either as packaged roasted coffee or in a coffee shop format. In cases of roasters like 
JUST Coffee Coop, they clearly advertise where the beans for sale are coming from. If the beans 
come from the Michiza cooperative, that information is mentioned on their packaging as well as 
more thorough information and links to the cooperative on their website.                    
Analyzing the Supply Chain Examples 
How does the consumer encounter individuals in the supply chain? 
Garland‘s argument asks after those we do not encounter directly who are distant 
strangers. It is slightly unclear what he means by ‘directly.’ Does he mean in close proximity or 




and relations with those we do not encounter directly in that sense, so I won’t revisit that issue 
here. For the purpose of this analysis, I interpret him to mean ‘concretely’ by directly. Here I 
explain the encounters the consumer may have in the coffe supply chains in the language of my 
Noddings-style care ethic.   
Conventional Chain 
If I am purchasing coffee from a modern grocery store and brew it, I may not know my 
coffee comes from Central America, much less Mexico, much less know of or about the people 
who helped bring it to me. My coffee experience might begin with seeing the packaging on the 
shelf and end with experiencing a cup of it in the morning. The nature of the conventional supply 
chain obscures individuals from each other. Even having read Daniel Jaffee’s book, knowing that 
my Nescafé cup could in part come from the Rincón, I have no way of actually investigating 
whether that is true.  
I could possibly encounter someone at the grocery store from which I purchase my 
coffee. But I might also purchase my coffee through an app or internet-based delivery service 
like Amazon.com or Instacart. In those instances I might not encounter anyone, or I might only 
encounter the delivery person handing me my packages. I could also go to a supermarket or 
hypermarket in which I do not encounter any individuals and use the self-checkout line. Even if 
someone at the supermarket or hypermarket helps me, it is most likely that we encounter each 
other as abstract individuals. If any response to needs occurs here, it is likely that it is ethically 
motivated or just a mechanistic response performed as part of a customer service job.  I could 
also live in a rural area with a small, independent grocer. In that case, perhaps because of the 
culture of my community, and the nature of the store, I do have a caring relation with my grocer. 




organizes sales in the region. Given the nature of a huge conglomerate like Nestlé, however, it is 
unlikely that the Nestlé representative has any connection with any other individuals in the 
supply chain. My grocer may however be connected to a delivery truck driver, who could be 
connected to someone at the warehouse, and so on. Suffice it to say that the ultimate coffee 
consumer is very far removed from many of the people involved in the supply chain, and may 
not encounter the ‘distant strangers’ in the supply chain. If the consumer does, then most of the 
encounters in that chain are likely abstract rather than concrete.  
Fair Trade/Organic Chain 
If a consumer buys their coffee from JUST Coop, it is possible for them to know that the 
Michiza cooperative is the producer. If they read the coffee package, it states clearly that the 
coffee comes from the Michiza cooperative. If they read about the Michiza cooperative online or 
on the package they may encounter an expression of need from the Coop. The coffee consumer 
is encountering these individuals abstractly. If they bu it in Madison, WI from the Coop 
headquarters they will encounter the Coop staff. These encounters are likely abstract as well. The 
Coop purchasers likely have encounters or relations with Miciza members. These could be 
abstract or concrete. If the JUST Coop purchasers and Michiza members who do business 
together are in their positions for long periods of time, it is likely that these relations are between 
individuals who encounter each other concretely. Coffee purchasing requires the Coop staff to 
travel onsite periodically; they likely meet with their counterpart staff and spend time in the 




Given the often abstract nature of encounters in the supply chain, how should the consumer 
respond? 
In Chapter 1 I discussed how the circles and chains of care as well as the nature of 
particular encounters will determine our obligations in caring for and caring about others. I 
discuss how that applies to each supply chain here.  
Conventional Chain 
I already explained that the conventional chain is goin  to be very long and that most of 
the consumer’s encounters will be with abstract others. The consumer may encounter a staff 
member at the grocery store in this supply chain. It is also possible the coffee consumer 
encounters the farmers of the Rincón through Daniel Jaffee’s book, a news article, or some other 
media. For each encounter, we can investigate its nature and how the consumer should respond. 
In the supermarket or hypermarket format, when a consumer encounters a grocery store 
clerk they likely encounter one another as abstract individuals. If needs are revealed in these 
encounters, they are likely responded to ethically or mechanistically as part of a job. Our roles as 
customers and store clerks may in part determine our sense of obligation to respond with care to 
expressions of need in one-another. For example in the hyp rmarket format, the institutional 
nature of the building and the corporate structure and branding may facilitate or block caring-for. 
Certain grocery chains, such as the chain Publix in the Am rican southeast, have built 
reputations as friendly, neighborhood stores. They encourage employees to interact with 
customers and to go beyond normal levels of customer service. In this case it is more likely that 
caring-for occurs. The obligation to respond to care with routine needs in the course of a grocery 
shopping trip is less strong. There is likely less at stake in t rms of damaging caring relations and 




What about if the consumer encounters the farmers or the coyote? In the conventional 
chain, the likely mechanism for this is through books or news media. Let’s consider that we may 
have read Daniel Jaffee’s 2007 book. In it we encountered the farmers in the Rincón who have 
trouble making money from coffee. We learned that one reason for this is that they are not well 
educated in how the world coffee market works and what current prices are. We infer a need for 
the farmers of the Rincón to better understand those market features and have more agency in the 
market in order to be able to have a more stable income. In turn that income could help them care 
better for their families and friends in their community and improve their ability to pursue other 
personal projects.   
 When I come to make the decision of what coffee to purchase, owever, the needs of the 
farmers in the Rincón is just one of many needs I may be balancing. I may also be thinking about 
how much money I have budgeted for groceries this week, which grocery store with what kind 
selection I can get to, and also what kind of coffee I most appreciate and enjoy as part of my 
personal self-care. My internal sense of “I must” towards the needs of the farmers of the Rincón 
might be small. In fact, it isn’t even clear to me whether my coffee purchase would help attend to 
their need or harm the farmers in some way.  
But as someone who works to cultivate a caring character, and who is concerned with 
supporting caring relations, those expressions of need might tri ger in me a broader evaluation of 
my engagement with this supply chain. If these are encounters of abstract others, I am caring-
about. It might not make sense for me to fly to Oaxaca to find the coyote to help educate him on 
market forces. For one, I don’t know Spanish, for another he would probably think I’m crazy for 
doing that. That would be a lot of energy and resources to resp nd to an expression of need that 




that cost less time and energy to indirectly respond to the expression of need, to support those 
closer to the individual to respond to the need with care. I can contact the Nestlé Corporation to 
enquire about their payment practices for their coffee supply. I can see if there are educational 
programs that I can donate to that might help people like the coyote and the farmers be better 
equipped to navigate the price structures in the coffee market. 
Fair Trade/Organic Chain 
In the case of the JUST Coop coffee that I buy in Madison, WI, I am more likely to 
encounter grocery staff and the chain of persons in the supply chain is definitely shorter. Even 
though JUST Coop is a cooperative business, it may not be the case that the employees or 
customers encounter one another in a way that is qualitatively different from the supermarket 
format. However, it is more likely that the coffee consumers who are customers of JUST Coop 
encounter the Michiza Cooperative members, albeit abstractly. They might do so through 
literature at the store or through the store staff members. 
In regards to the analysis of what a consumer should do in response to an expression of 
need of a JUST Cooper member, I think this will be similar to the discussion of the grocery staff 
in the conventional supply chain. In regards to the Michiza Cooperative, however, we prima 
facie might think there is a difference between the encounter of the conventional farmers and the 
coyote in the above example and the fair/organic farmers in this example due to the difference in 
the supply chain length. The fewer links in the supply chain give a sense that cooperative 
members are ‘closer’ to us. Is that really true? The coffee growers in both supply chains are 
neighbors in the same community. They are not geographically closer. But perhaps it may be 




The members of the Michiza Cooperative however will still be abstract individuals to the 
coffee consumer. However, the coffee consumer who purchases their coffee directly from JUST 
is more able to ask after the members: to find out more about their lives, their needs, and so on. 
So in this example the consumer is more easily able to turn cari g about into caring for by 
encountering the coffee growers more concretely. The consumer is likely to feel a stronger 
connection, and thus stronger motivational displacement towards the Michiza Cooperative 
members if they become more concrete. Here, though, caring- bout is still preferable. Although 
the consumer in this instance is more likely to encounter the growers—abstractly or concretely—
the consumer’s other obligations and balance of needs and resources is still present.  
The consumer as carer may have moved along the spectrum a little further towards the 
concrete end, but I still don’t think we would want to say that properly the consumer should turn 
this encounter into a concrete encounter involving caring-for. The consumer would still have to 
journey to southern Mexico or telecommunicate to care for a cooperative member, and it is still 
likely the effort would be received as strange. As a consumer of coffee from JUST Coop, the 
carer is responding to needs by caring about already. The carer is supporting the Michiza 
Cooperative and JUST Coop to create businesses which operate in the same market sphere as 
Nestlé, but do so in a way that gives more space for care. That is, persons have more resources 
and freedom to act and respond with care in the fair trade example than in the conventional 
example. For instance in the fair trade example, families have more stable incomes and may be 
better able to respond to needs of family members that require financial resources than those 
families in the conventional supply chain. Additionally, the Michiza cooperative brought 
together people and exposed them to other indigenous movements which had the effect of 




What about cases where the consumer does not encounter persons in the supply chain abstractly 
or concretely? 
It may be unclear how Noddings’s carer, if not abstractly or concretely encountering 
individuals in the food supply chain, has any obligation to respond—after all, she says “in 
encounter, obligation happens” (2002b, p. 50). Within the food system, carers may occupy many 
different roles. If they lack information on the system or fail to recognize a need or a harm it may 
be because of a lack of transparency within the system, or by design of the carer or a mix of the 
two. So the carer may fail to encounter an individual because of ignorance. This ignorance may 
be willful or not.  
Whether willful or not, ignorance in regards to the food system means that consumers 
may fail to recognize harms that they benefit from. This ignorance can be willful, such as 
privileged Western consumers that insulate themselves from encounter. Perhaps I just don’t want 
to know where my coffee comes from. The ignorance could also be unwilling, such as that 
stemming from the lack of transparency in the food system as in the case of the conventional 
coffee supply chain. Noddings, in her own writing, seems to remain agnostic on whether one is 
more culpable than the other. I think that in some cases our ignorance is not morally justifiable. 
Willful ignorance and ignorance that results from laziness are reflective of a lack of care for 
persons in the wider world. This is not in step with the truth of interconnectedness and 
interdependency. Certainly, there is a limit on what we have time and resources to look into and 
know. But if we remain ignorant in one instance because we were concerned with learning about 
another instance, this is not an example of our actions belying our caring character. It is just an 




One way of looking at this is to say that supply chains that lack transparency are ethical 
hazards for the carer. One could be, albeit in a small way, contributing to and participating in 
chains of harm. For the person who has made a commitment o be a carer, benefiting from and 
participating in such a structure would belie their commitment.  
We could also ask about the problem of willful isolation from encounter. On the one 
hand, purposeful isolation from encounter is sometimes morally excusable and appropriate. 
Noddings gives the example of a parent controlling their child’s encounters to prevent the child 
from encountering those who would do the child harm. Or, as an adult, one might control their 
own encounters to avoid those that bring out the worst in the r c aracter. As a carer, one wants to 
cultivate a caring character. If repeated encounters with a particular individual damages that 
character, it is harmful to the carer. But are there instances where controlling encounter is not 
morally excusable? Recall the proximate stranger in Chapter 1. This is a person not linked to the 
carer through established relations or the circles of care. The carer may fear the proximate 
stranger for the obligation put on the carer. However, it is not morally excusable for the carer to 
meet the proximate stranger in such a way that they try to avoid facing this obligation.  
Here I have in mind when we lie to someone who asks us for something, or avert our 
gaze to attempt to discourage them from approaching us. We know the ther is there, but we 
refuse to meet them as a concrete individual. Instead we bring social roles or lies to the encounter 
to hide behind the safety of abstraction. If they are more abstracted, we feel the sense of “I must” 
less strongly, and we are often attentive to and motivated towards different needs. Usually those 
needs are less emotionally and socially tricky to meet. It is emotionally and socially easier to 
hand over money than it is to ask after someone’s welfare sometimes. Especially in a society 




practical wisdom in caring and a caring character, however, will feel guilty for not having lived 
up to that character.  
Additionally we might consider that if someone has limited caring capacity and 
resources, and the number of encounters of need in their regular life exceeds those, we would 
think it morally excusable if they avoided encounter. However, if a person had the caring 
capacity and resources, but still willfully isolated themselves, this would not be excusable. I 
would question whether we would characterize this person as being a carer or having sufficient 
capacity to care.  
Adela Cortina and David Crocker, in response to this issue, devloped the concept of 
autonomous consumption which is a reflective rather than unthinking activity. They suggest that 
ethical consumption is a reflective practice that asks the consumer to learn about products, reflect 
on what is influencing them, and consider the impacts to others t at their decision will have. 
While the care ethicist would eschew the term ‘autonomous’, I agree that this framework is one 
wherein consumers could make ethical (for the care ethicist: caring) decisions.  
Conventional Chain 
If the consumer does not encounter individuals in the conventional supply chain 
described in this Chapter, are they morally at fault in some way? If the consumer is not complicit 
in the ignorance, I do not think we can hold them morally accountable. However, if the consumer 
knows that supply chains are long and tricky, and the consumer knows that coffee is a product 
where the conventional farmers are generally exploited— ven though they have not encountered 
the farmers engaged in the particular supply chain mentioned above—I think we should question 




Fair Trade/Organic Chain 
In this instance, if the consumer does not encounter individuals in the supply chain are 
they are fault? Again, we can ask whether this avoidance of encounter is willful or not. It seems 
as though it is likely that people choose to purchase coffe in this supply chain, however, 
because they are seeking to encounter those involved in the coffe supply chain, even if only 
directly. Those carers who seek out a fair trade supply chain likely do so because it is more likely 
to be in line with the care ethic.  
Summarizing How the Care Ethic Generates Global Moral Concern for Distant Others that are 
not Encountered Concretely 
In this section I have described two coffee supply chains which operate in parallel by 
starting and ending in the same places, but are different in the number and quality of encounters 
and relations within them. In both cases I claimed that the consumer did not have robust 
obligations towards the distant strangers in the supply chain. I also claimed that engaging in 
certain supply chains as a consumer may be an ethical hazard in some cases. In some cases, it i 
a moral failure such as when we remain willfully ignorant of how we are engaging with 
structures that damage the web of care. It is a moral failure because we act out of unconcern, out 
of a viewpoint that ignores or possibly rejects the fundamental truth of our interconnectedness in 
webs of care. 
There may however be pushback against my claim that this is sometimes a moral failure. 
Certainly, we might fail to act in accord with a caring character, but the willful ignorance and 
avoidance of encounter did not seem that serious in the above examples. I think examples of 
encounter with distant strangers who suggest needs regardin more clear harms may generate 




(CIW) member and former Florida tomato picker: “Sometimes you could feel the breeze from 
the pesticide they were spraying over there” (Gesturing to neighboring field) “It felt good. They 
don’t tell you about the risks” (Food Chains, 2014). Second, a quote from Hlaing Min, a 
formerly a slave in Benjina, Thailand aboard a fishing vessel: “If Americans and Europeans are 
eating this fish, they should remember us… There must be a mountain of bones under the sea. ... 
The bones of the people could be an island, it’s that many” (McDowell, Mason, & Mendoza, 
2015). In response to those encounters, both of abstract and distant strangers, how is the 
consumer obligated to respond?  
I think in both these examples, as carers we experience the internal state of care, even 
though it is caring-about, more strongly. Both of these quotes, although short and without much 
context, tell stories of serious and tragic harms to a number of people. And both of those quotes 
come from people who worked in parts of food supply chains that ultimately get eaten at U.S. 
tables. Still in these cases, although the carer is motivated to respond to the needs arising in the 
encounters, they are going to have many competing concerns. It may still not be the case that our 
practical wisdom guides us to avoid consuming products that may have come from these supply 
chains if it requires us to damage other relations in the web of care. What then? 
Noddings acknowledges and I agree that sometimes the carer is faced with systems that 
they “feel powerless to eliminate” despite the damage they do to the web of care (2002b, p. 212). 
However, ignoring problematic issues because they are tough or because we feel powerless is not 
acceptable for the care ethicist. She argues that when we commit harms—or when systems we 
subscribe to enable harms—“the ethic of care refuses to absolve us from this evil. If we cannot 
find it in our conscience to refuse [the evil]… then we must at least acknowledge the tragedy and 




expressed by Hlaing Min and Lucas Benitez, the carer should n t turn away from these needs 
and create elaborate schemes of justification in attempts to absolve ourselves from engaging with 
and perhaps contributing to these harmful systems. Like the carer directly facing the expression 
of need that they are unable to respond to, the carer facing the needs of distant abstract others or 
the damage to the web of care caused by a system like our food system we must face the tragedy 
and reject justifying it. If the carer does turn away, this is a moral failure. 
So, the care ethic does not ever justify the carer divesting themselves of responsibility for 
consumption choices. It is possible, however, that the car r has overriding concerns. However 
this will always be true for any particular concern of the care ethicist. I’ve shown in the analysis 
of the two examples that the consumer does not have robust bligations towards distant strangers 
in the supply chain. But Garland is not correct in suggesting that attention to the inner circles of 
care and responding to concrete others precludes having moral concern for abstract others or to 
acting on caring-about. I have shown that the care ethicdoes generate a global moral concern, 
even though it does not generate the robust obligation Garland discussed. Instead, this concern is 
expressed through acting on caring about. Or, when resources are constrained, this concern is 
expressed when the carer faces the tragedy of the situation.  
Thus far, I have focused on the traditional food ethics topic f consumer choice. In the 
rest of this chapter, I go on to consider other aspects of the U.S. food system. The following 
discussions will explain what comes to the carer’s attention when we look at encounters and 
relations in other areas of the food system. At the end of the next section, the differences in the 




Section 3: Analyzing Harms and Goods in Lives of Migrant Agricultural Workers 
In this last section I zoom in on particular examples of harms in the United States food 
system. I do so to show how the care ethic analyzes harms nd goods in encounter and relation in 
the food system. First I describe one case of sexual har ssment, violence, and abuse against 
undocumented migrant workers. I discuss how the care ethic evaluates the encounters and 
relations in this example. The discussion serves to illustrate what comes to the attention of the 
care ethicist in such examples. I then zoom out from this particular example, and make a case 
that the type of harms described are facilitated by certain labor policies and practices in the U.S. 
food system. Further, the ability of persons to respond with care to those harmed is limited by 
other policies and structures in the system. In the third pa t of this section I examine additional 
ways the labor policies and practice in the food system damage relations in the web of care. In 
the final part of this section I examine one candidate for a structural solution to these problems.  
Violence Against Women at the DeCoster Egg Processing Facility 
The DeCoster Farms company is one of the largest egg processers in the nation and sells 
the eggs under the brand Quality Egg, LLC. They operate or have operated in Maine, Iowa, and 
North Carolina and have been cited in numerous law suits and h ve been accused of perpetuating 
labor abuses and poor food safety practices for decades. The DeCoster egg processing facility in 
Wright County, Iowa is one of many in a state that has more than 50 million laying hens 
producing eggs (Robinson, 2013). In January 2002, the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission determined that supervisors at the Wright County facility had 
“sexually assaulted and harassed female employees, especially those of Mexican and other 
Hispanic national origin - some of whom were undocumented workers at the time - and 




events there was an employment discrimination lawsuit against DeCoster Farms, but they never 
admitted liability in the case although they did settle with the plaintiffs. The documentary “Rape 
in the Fields” interviews several people involved in the incidents mentioned, and here I discuss 
how the care ethic evaluates these harms that occurred in the U.S. food system.  
The female employees of the egg processing facility in question report being subject to 
sexual harassment and violence on repeated occasions. They were also on at least one occasion 
imprisoned in the plant. On that particular occasion, they were “sleeping in cardboard boxes”, 
fed eggs, and not allowed to leave for three days (Bergmen & Cediel, 2013). These are 
encounters and relations between the women working at the facility nd the plant supervisors and 
plant manager that result in harm. Sexual assault, harassment, and imprisonment are evidential 
that the relations and encounters were not caring ones. Not only does this harm the individuals 
involved in those relations and encounters, but this has harmful effects in those individuals’ webs 
of care. The women’s caring relations with their family, friends and others will likely suffer as a 
result of their imprisonment and abuse. The supervisors and m nger, too, in perpetrating these 
harms, damage their caring character and further impede th ir ability to have caring relations and 
encounters at work and likely elsewhere. 
Additionally, these types of abuse the women suffered hamper their ability to express a 
need for help. The shame of being a victim of sexual assault, combined with a fear of 
repercussions if they report the assault (which is a featur  of their relation with the supervisors 
and manager), means they are less likely to express needsregarding those harms. This includes 
the need for physical and mental help as a victim, the need for legal justice, or even the need to 




From the care ethic lens, the features of the relations and encounters between the workers 
and the supervisors and manager of the plant bring certain fe tures of the harms into relief. 
Additionally this example shows that these uncaring encounters and relations have impacts that 
echo in the web of care, damaging care beyond the immediate rel tions. In this case however the 
women were able to express a need for help and people did respond to their needs.  
An example of this is the courageous action of Berta Alberts, a high school teacher in 
Iowa, who found out the mother of one her students was imprisoned at an egg processing facility 
along with many other undocumented women. Alberts went to the facility and demanded the 
women’s release, driving them home in her van (Bergman & Cediel, 2013). She says that she 
“built this trust with them, that I can help them” which resulted in one of the women later 
coming to Alberts with more accusations about other instances of imprisonment, sexual 
harassment, and rape. Alberts helped put them in touch with a crisis intervention team, and then 
a lawyer. Because of the women’s fear of deportation and law enforcement, they d id not go to 
the police at that time.  
In this example, Alberts initially encounters the mother and the other women as abstract 
individuals. She chooses however to respond to them directly as if caring for concrete 
individuals. We can point to their close connection via the daughter through a chain of care. 
Alberts cared for her student, and her student cared for her mother. In virtue of the chain of care, 
she turned her caring-about into caring-for. Alberts acted on her caring-for of the student, driving 
to the facility and demanding the release of not only the mother, but the other women as well. 
These caring encounters turned into caring relations, as Alberts m ntions when she said she 
“built this trust with them, that I can help them.” That relation kept the women connected to 




helped the undocumented women in a way that was particular to their needs and projects. The 
women wanted the violence and abuse to stop, but they did not wa t to be deported or have to 
deal with the police.  
We can imagine that if Alberts did not build that trust, the women would not have sought 
her out to help them further. The care ethicist understands the ‘trust’ that Alberts mentions, as the 
women’s recognition of the care that Alberts had for the women. So, if Alberts had called the 
police to go down to the egg processing facility, it is likely the women would have either not 
known it was Alberts that had acted to bring that about, or if they did know, it is likely they 
would not have received this as Alberts caring for or about them. Or, if Alberts had not acted as 
she did during that initial encounter when the women recognized Alberts cared for them, it is less 
likely they would have continued the relation. 
Alberts's actions are certainly praiseworthy under the care ethic. She establishes, 
maintains and enhances caring relations in the web of care. Was she obligated to turn her caring-
about these women into caring-for? I don’t know the particular of Alberts's position in the 
community beyond her role as a teacher, her personal resources and the level of risk she 
experienced in going to the processing facility—it could be that in Alberts's situation she was 
obligated to do so. I think for most people, however, such action is superogatory. Laudable, but 
not obligatory.  
This example illustrates a few unique things about the care ethic. One, the care ethic 
lauds this type of interaction: caring encounters. What is special about caring encounters is that 
they can beget caring relations, just as happened in the example above. I don’t think other ethics 
are going to be intrinsically interested that Alberts built up a relation of trust with these women 




other goods, for instance happiness, but it is the care ethic that views such relationships as a good 
in themselves.  
Each individual can only control their own actions, so they can only control what they do 
in encounter. But they can endeavor to act in encounter in such a way that the other person in the 
encounter recognizes the care. So, Alberts couldn’t know that her action that night to free the 
women would result in them ultimately getting documented satu  and legal help to end the 
abuse of workers in the processing plant. Nor could Alberts know that their story would end up 
helping the narrative of a larger movement to change the working conditions for similar women. 
But that evening, she knew she could act in response to theneed of these women. The care ethic 
is going to be concerned with the way she interacted with them and how she responded to that 
need. The fact that she interacted with them in such a way that a caring relation emerged is 
evidence that it was a caring encounter. Other ethics are not going to be interested in these 
nuances of the human interactions and what kind of relation emerges (if it does).  
Another interesting thing to point out—in this example, we see caring encounters and 
caring relations in the food chain—but no food is mentioned. Alberts does not in the example 
above consider changing her egg buying choices, or choose to boyc tt the groceries who carry 
eggs from the plant. In the example above, she responds directly to the needs of the women who 
were abused at the processing facility the way one would paradigm tically respond to encounters 
of concrete others motivated by caring-for. Choosing to no longer buy eggs processed in 
DeCoster plants is one way to act on caring-about the women who were harmed, but there are 
many things we can do between Alberts's courageous actions and making purchase decisions that 




are at the end of the section, I turn next to zoom out fr m this particular example and look at the 
structural issues in play in the labor abuses against migrant agricultural workers.  
Structures Contributing to Labor Abuses Such as in the DeCoster Facility Example 
Migrant farm workers face a number of harms working in the United States, including 
but not limited to: unreliable pay days, low wages that do not adequat ly cover living costs, 
inability to access affordable housing, slavery, exposure to toxic levels of chemicals, sexual 
harassment, rape, and other forms of violence (Nichols, Stein, & Wold, 2014, p. 365). The 
background information I gave on DeCoster Farms mentioned that this is not the only time one 
of their facilities has been the site of labor abuses including sexual assault and harassment. This 
background information in combination with the details of the incident at the Wright County 
facility can lead the carer to investigate whether there are larger structural features enabling the 
harms or acting as barriers to care.  
We could look into whether or not the management practices and policies at the Wright 
County facility are such a structure. We can step back further and ask whether in general at 
DeCoster facilities there are practices and policies of such a nature. Further back, we can ask 
whether there are general labor practices and policies in the United States food system that 
enable harms or act as barriers to care. Here I’m going to analyze one group of such structures 
that influence the ability of these workers as undocumented women to seek protection from 
harm. I think this area of analysis is a good candidate for several reasons. Women who have no 
practical means for protection or legal redress within the workplace or outside of it are going to 
be especially vulnerable to those who would seek to do them har . Consider that their status as 
undocumented workers will likely be known to those they encounter and are in relation with in 




related to the harm because of their status. If the victims of such crimes are effectively silenced, 
and the perpetrators never removed, then this can perpetuate a cycle of harm.  
Other ethics are likely going to agree that there is a problem with the abuse of migrant 
workers and their ability to seek justice. However, the salient features of this problem are going 
to be different from a care perspective and a rights perspective, for example. The rights 
perspective is going to look into the violation of personal rights, how those are going to be 
restored, and perhaps how remedies are going to be sought for victims of violence. The care 
perspective is going to look at different things: the intersection of many vulnerabilities and 
unequal power relations that contribute to the problems, and also the damage to caring relations 
and the web of care done by these acts. Both perspectives are going to suggest that better policies 
and institutional structures are needed to address this issue.But the rights perspective isn’t going 
to ask about the relations and encounters between migrant farm workers and those who enforce 
the policies at the local bureaucratic level.  
For example in the case above, if we wanted to care about women who are imprisoned 
and abused such as those in the egg processing facility, we are going to look at the structures and 
institutions that made it impossible or at least, very harmful, for them to seek help from the 
police. Or, the way the care ethicist is going to phrase it: those structures and policies that made 
it impossible for the police and others to respond with care to those women. The sheriff’s office 
in that location was charged with both responding to crimes like those the women were victims 
of, but also responsible for reporting illegal immigration ssues. A journalist asked the Sheriff at 
the time, “Then that puts you in a—kind of an impossible situation, doesn’t it?” The Sheriff 




2013). It is impossible for these parties to have a caring encounter or relation because of the laws 
and structures in this situation.   
The care ethicist is going to notice that these encounters and relations, no matter how 
good our policies are, are likely always going to be ones of hugely unequal power differences 
and thus fraught with peril for the vulnerable migrant workers who are affected by such policies. 
Undocumented migrant workers are at the mercy of the policy enforcers, who can decide 
whether to care about or care for them and respond in a nuanced and fair way to their expression 
of need. Given the historical record of how these encounters turn out (anecdotally at least it 
seems that policy enforcers in organizations like Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE] 
generally do not act on care for or about illegal immigrants) and the high risk if an encounter 
goes poorly, it seems that most migrant workers would likely not want to seek aid from those 
policy enforcers.  
Additionally, the care ethicist is going to be concerned about the people working for ICE: 
are their caring characters being damaged by being constrained in their ability to respond with 
care to those who express need? Since immigration enforcement is increasingly managed by and 
carried out by the same people as criminal enforcement, we begin to see the same abuses of 
power and personal tolls in people in enforcement rolls (“Policing Immigrant Communities,” 
2015). A young man who was detained with his mother in Michigan reports that he “remembers 
his mother crying the whole time, and begging the officers to stop humiliating her… instead of 
responding with human decency, the [ICE] officer told her to be glad they didn’t shoot her in the 
head” (Dado, 2011). Another example of ICE officials turning away from expressions of need is 
the failure of ICE officers in detention facilities to report many allegations of sexual abuse and 




two of many examples of how immigration enforcement officials may turn away from 
expressions of need. It is an open question as to the motivations nd reasoning for the officers to 
act as they did. If keeping your job with ICE means always toeing the policy line, and that does 
not allow individuals to respond with care to expressions of need, this is going to harm the carers 
in those jobs. But additionally, if the culture and system surrounding these work environments 
encourages, overtly allows, or even tacitly allows such actions, the carer is going to be 
concerned.   
Most ethics would endorse advocating that migrant workers should n t fear deportation 
by ICE if they report slavery, rape, or other violence. Since 2000 the United States has had the 
U-Visa program to address this, but the yearly limit on the number of U-Visas issued is far lower 
than the number desired. The case at the Wright County egg processing facility was actually one 
of the first instances in which the U-Visa was used. However, the protection of the U-Visa is not 
universally available in the United States. The U-Visa process r quires a law enforcement 
agency to sign off on the paperwork. Studies have shown that certifying law enforcement 
agencies do not consistently apply the rules surrounding the U-Visa and may unilaterally or 
arbitrarily decide to sign applications or not sign them (Abreu et al., 2014, p. 3). This results in a 
“geographical roulette” for applicants (p. 4). If U-Visas are not available to all such victims, or if 
the process to get them is too burdensome, then this policy ‘solution’ does not turn out to be a 
solution for all–only for the lucky. In addition, the processing time for these visas averages one 
year. This further exacerbates the likelihood that victims either will not or cannot take advantage 




Additional Ways Structures in the Food System Damage the Web of Care  
The examples discussed above are just some of the ways the labor practices and policies 
in the U.S. food system may damage relations in the web of care or create barriers to the 
formation of caring relations. I mentioned in passing that harmful encounters and relations can 
have repercussions on individuals’ abilities and capacities to respond with care to other people in 
their lives. Here, I want to look at one subset of such cases: how labor practices in the food 
system make it difficult to care for children. Relations between parents and children are 
important in our lived experiences, as well as theoretically important for the care ethicist. There 
are many features of the lives of migrant agricultural workers that make it difficult for those 
farmworkers to care for their children. Below, I show how the system that migrant agricultural 
workers live and work in can make it difficult if not impossible, for caring relations to flourish 
between parents (or other caregivers) and their children. 
First, farmworkers often make (on average) minimum wage or bel w minimum wage, 
and many families live at or below the poverty line (National Agricultural Workers Survey, 
2004). The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires that they are paid the prevailing minimum 
wage, but advocacy groups report widespread problems with wage theft, paying under the 
minimum wage by paying workers “piece-rate”, and changing wage records of workers 
(Farmworker Justice, 2015, p. 2-6, 9). This stress on financial resources puts pressure on 
farmworkers’ ability and resources to care for their children. This includes the ability to provide 
adequate shelter, food, clothes, and entertainment or enrichment. Farmworker families are 
usually faced with the struggle to find adequate housing at rates they can afford in the western 
United States and have to put up with whatever housing employers provide in the eastern United 




planting our nation’s food experience food insecurity. Many children may not have their own 
belongings including “appropriate clothing and toys” (Martin et al., 1995, p. 269).  
Low wages effect the relations between parents and children in a umber of ways. First, 
these low wages put constraints on parents’ financial resources to respond to some of their 
children’s needs. Additionally, the desire to make enough money to subsist and be able to better 
respond to needs means that parents may choose to work more or longer hours. This has the 
effect of separating parents and children for long periods of time, which also diminishes their 
ability to establish, enhance and maintain caring relations. Financial constraints may also lead to 
stress and anxiety in family members which could reduce their emotional capacity to respond 
with the basic attitude to expressions of need. In this regard, the structural barriers to care for 
migrant agricultural workers looks similar to many low-income or poverty-level households in 
the United States. 
However, these families also face stressors from other asp cts of the agricultural worker 
system. As I discussed earlier, many of these workers ar  undocumented (over 50%) and thus 
face the fear and stress of worrying about detention or deportation (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2015; “Children at Work”, 2013; Dado, 2011).  Many families migrate for work 
seasonally, and thus have trouble connecting with stable community systems and using public 
services like health, childcare, and educational services (“Children at Work”, 2013; Weathers, 
Minkovitz, O’Campo, & Diener-West, 2004; Hovey & Magaña, 2002). This has a number of 
impacts on the members of these families. They may experienc  anxiety and depression with the 
difficulty of acculturation which is correlated with family dysfunction, low self-esteem, and 
ineffective social support (Hovey & Magaña, 2002). Children of migrant farm workers have 




depression, and phobia” (Martin et al., 1995, p. 269). These negative effects of migration are 
compounded by the limitations on the migrants’ ability to access health services. Because of lack 
of knowledge, cultural barriers and transportation barriers especially; but also because of 
linguistic, cost, and time barriers, migrant agricultural workers face high levels of unmet health 
service needs (Acury & Quandt, 2007; Weathers et al., 2004). This includes mental health 
services. This constant migration also means that children ar  in and out of school systems which 
leads to poor academic achievement and loss of confidence in academic ability (“Children at 
Work”, 2013; Martin et al., 1995, p. 269). Children may also be pulled out of school early or 
dropped off late in order to work to help the family make money. It is estimated that there is a 
60% drop out rate among such students (“Children at Work”, 2013).  
These stressors from migrating for work and having trouble connecting to communities 
and public services can have negative impacts on caring relations in families. Physical and 
mental illnesses can diminish carers’ capacity and ability to respond with care to expressions of 
need. The stress of moving and deciding when and where to move takes a toll on families. 
Additionally, in many situations children may be unable to complete enough education to have 
adequate reading or comprehension skills to overcome some of th se obstacles in the next 
generation. So, not only do these structural issues effect th  urrent relations in families, the care 
or lack of care expressed and received now can have repercussions for future generations’ 
abilities to have caring relations.  
A third issue is that farmworkers and their children may suffer numerous physical health 
issues in result of structural features of the parents’ involvement in this livelihood. Housing 
conditions are poor, either because they have a hard time affording their own housing or because 




quarters or individual homes or trailers” and in urban or rural areas, but it is common that it is 
substandard (Keim-Malpass et al., 2015). Parents and their child en are exposed to harmful 
chemicals and other substances through environmental features of the home; e.g. living next to 
fields, dangerous housing conditions, exposure to parents’ clothing after they return from the 
fields, or from working in the fields themselves (Keim-Malpass et al., 2015; Beti et al., 2003; 
McCauley et al., 2001). If the children work in the fields, they may be exposed to such chemicals 
or other issues like organic dusts and exposure-related i lnesses (“Children at Work”, 2013). In 
the home, conditions may be unsanitary including unfit drinking water, poor air quality, 
temperature and moisture issues (Martin et al., 1995, p. 269).  
So how does the care ethic view of all these things? Well, th  care ethic is going to ask 
after the encounters and relations here as everywhere else. If children suffer developmental 
issues from chemical and toxin exposure, or other harms fro these dangerous environmental 
factors, the physical and mental impacts of these issues could diminish their capacity for care 
later in life. Additionally, I discussed in Chapter 1 how children must be cared-for in order to 
learn to care for and then care about others. It is worth asking whether some of these conditions 
may make it difficult for parents to develop good caring relations or have caring encounters with 
their children in these conditions. Further, without stable communities and schools, it may be 
difficult for children to develop caring relations with other adults. If children are not 
experiencing and learning from caring relations in the home r in their communities, then they 
may not develop the ability to care themselves. This harms the children as well as those they 
encounter and are in relation with now and in the future. W  begin to see then that the 
combination of the financial, health, migratory and other stressors on these families are barriers 




This is not an indictment of farmworkers’ ability to parent their children or their care for 
their children. If anything the reports, documentaries, interviews and news articles about these 
families demonstrates that the parents and caregivers are often dedicated to their children and 
may just be trying to make the best decision possible gven very difficult circumstances. 
Farmworkers work extremely long days and many more hours a week than typical American 
employees. Shortage of money means parents may not be able to afford childcare for younger 
children for those long hours. These children will either end up poorly attended, unattended at 
home, unattended in a vehicle at the workplace, or onsite at the farm or field or plant. So, parents 
are often separated from their children unless they bring them o the fields. In those 
circumstances it could be a caring decision to bring your children into the fields despite some of 
the dangers. Or, if your family lives in poverty and paycheck to paycheck, it makes sense why 
you would bring your underage children with you and let them work if they can. In one 
documentary a 10-year old who helped his family in the tobacco fields, said he was “proud” to 
do so (“Children at Work”, 2013). We could understand as evidence that the child was caring for 
his family.  
Some in the farm lobby argue that it should be up to the parents of these children whether 
or not it is the best decision for the children to work in the fields. That as outsiders to the 
situation, we do not understand the context. At first glance, that sort of take on the situation may 
seem to be in step with a caring analysis. I have discussed at length the importance of situational 
context to ethical judgements for carers. The concern here, owever, is not whether or not the 
parents in the context are making the most caring choice in response to the needs of their 
children—it is whether or not the structures in place make it impossible or very difficult for the 




field exposed to harmful chemicals is caring in general, or that having a 10-year old exposed to 
nicotine in the fields is caring in general. However, I think we might understand from a caring 
perspective that it could be a caring decision in a certain context.  
At the same time, the care ethicist can look at the situation as a whole and draw 
connections between the difficulties in caring for the c ildren that these parents face, and the 
labor practices and policies surrounding agricultural workers in the United States. The next 
question would be, what would a lack of barriers, or the presence of facilitators look like? 
Adequate wages, adequate and safe housing, access to health services, access to education for 
children and childcare are possibilities for making space for and facilitating caring relations in 
this sphere. It remains open at what age youth should be able to work in the fields and doing 
what jobs, or what hours parents should have to work and be away from their kids. The care 
ethicist would ask after what policies and practices would best allow decision-makers close to 
the situation to respond with care to expressions of need.  
Potential for Structures that Facilitate Caring in These Spaces 
For all the reasons discussed above, the care ethicist is going to endorse structures where 
there is more mutuality and space for care in agricultural labor policies and practices. The ideal 
would be a structure that allows and facilitates these individuals to connect as humans in caring 
ways. An example of this is the self-policing practiced by the migrant workers who belong to the 
CIW in Florida. As part of their Fair Food Program (FFP), workers, growers and retailers work 
together to create a more fair and safe food system. The FFP involves legally binding agreements 
between CIW and produce buyers which include provisions for premium on produce sold and 
agreement to a code of conduct (Fair Food Program, n.d.). That premium goes directly to 




complaint and investigation processes, and auditing through collaboration between migrant 
workers, organized labor groups, growers, and buyers.  
These policies and mechanisms work together to create structures that not only don’t 
facilitate harms, don’t act as barriers to care, but actually facilitate care in the spaces where 
migrant agricultural workers live and work. The FFP is good in the view of the care ethic for a 
number of reasons. First, it empowers the previously less powerful to express needs, to have their 
needs heard, and to have their needs responded to with care. This is accomplished through 
educational modules required for all workers, trainings for supervisors and managers, opening up 
opportunities for dialogue amongst the various levels of employees and stakeholders, and 
developing a community policing model. Second, it allows agricultural workers more physical, 
emotional, and resource security which enables them to better create, maintain, and enhance 
caring relations at work, at home and in the community. The FFP has been successful in reducing 
incidents of workplace violence, women report feeling safer, and agricultural workers receive 
better wages, which all contribute to the security and resources necessary to care. There also 
further benefits to the web of care such as the sense of community the success of this project 
engenders and the sense of dignity and connection to others in the supply chain it has fostered 
(Greg Asbed and Lucas Benitez in Bergen & Celied, 2013). Fostering a sense of community can 
enable caring relations and encounters to happen more easily because a sense of community 
reinforces the basic truth of our interconnectedness. The same can be said of the fact that the FFP 
generates a sense of connection to others in the supply chain. I think we can also understand a 
sense of dignity as a benefit to carers, as it likely adds to our emotional resources and thus our 
ability to care.  One thing the FFP does not address is housing is ues for farmworkers. 




So the experience of the CIW in enacting the FFP shows that there is a structural model 
that can prevent harms and facilitate care in this space. This doesn’t just fix how owners or 
supervisors interact with and treat workers, but also how workers treat owners (from a place of 
more empowerment), and how workers relate to one-another (as a community or team, and with 
more respect). A lot of relations and encounters get altered by this way of doing things. Victims 
do not have to fear going to ICE or the police, nor do they have to hope for the possibility of a U-
Visa. Further, the additional income to families and community connection helps facilitate caring 
relations in the home, such as those between parents and children. So those relations and 
encounters get altered in the FFP model. The additional income may alleviate food insecurity 
issues, some stress and anxiety, and possibly the need for children to work in the fields. The 
education and community engagement means that workers are better connected to and have 
knowledge of public resources. This improves parents’ capacity for responding with care to 
expressions of need.  
Instead of creating barriers to care, the FFP has created a space that does not enable 
harms and allows for caring responses to expressions of need. And the FFP model is different 
from a welfare-focused model. The FFP model makes space for p ople to respond with care to 
what arises in encounter and relation, by empowering the parti s involved. If we just focused on 
welfare and improving individual welfare components like income, safety, and education, people 
might be better off in terms of those welfare considerations, but they wouldn’t necessarily have 
better caring relations. The FFP model shows that by supporting spaces where caring encounters 
and caring relations can happen and flourish, we get the welfare results and the overall 





This discussion in Section 3 has also illustrated what an an lysis of the food system 
reveals as opposed to an analysis focused on food consumption. In both cases, I discussed the 
competing concerns that carers face and how they may respond to expressions of need that arise 
in their encounters and relations. As carers, if we carabout those harmed in the U.S. food 
system, we will be moved to respond to their needs. In deciding how to do so, we should ask 
after the best way to respond so that we support caring relations in the web of care—whether 
directly or not. Consumer choice is one way to affect change. Especially if the only thing the 
people in charge of the practices and policies in the food system care about is money, then 
consumer choice can put pressure on their bottom line and ncourage changes. In those cases 
consumer power is important and the view of why consumer preference should be focused on 
becomes clear. However, there are all kinds of real world ways in which this is wrong. Consumer 
choice is one source of power, but it is not the only source of power.  
By focusing on consumer choice you might not damage the web of care, but you might 
not help the best you could either. A carer’s energies might be better spent cultivating different 
caring relations, or focusing our caring-about towards different p ople. There could be pressure 
points in the food system where as citizens and neighbors we could do things to support positive 
changes. For instance, we could support expansion of the Fair Food Program or legislative 
efforts to create more fair policies for agricultural workers. The case of Berta Alberts was 
especially illustrative of how one’s action as a neighbor who cares can have a bigger impact than 
one’s action as a conscious consumer. There are opportunities for working or volunteering with 
crisis centers, immigration legal help centers, and so on. L oking at the food we eat as the output 
of a whole system, and zooming out to look at that whole structure, draws the carer’s focus to 




In this section I made a case for how the care ethic analyzes the harms and goods 
associated with a particular problem in the U.S. food system: sexual violence and harassment 
against migrant agricultural workers. I showed how we can analyze the harms and responses in 
relation and encounter at the site of the harms and the subsequent needs that arise in those who 
are harmed. I zoomed out to give an analysis of some of the structures that contribute to this 
issue and concluded by examining one model way to create a caring structure in this space. 
Chapter 2 Conclusion 
In this chapter I responded to arguments from Deane Curtin and William Garland about 
how and if we can apply a Noddings-style care ethic to an issue of global moral concern in the 
public sphere, the U.S. food system. I showed that the care ethic can generate global moral 
concern for distant strangers, and provide a coherent analysis of individual and structural issues 
within the food system. I argued that the average consumer does not have a strong positive 
obligation to distant strangers in the food supply chain, but they nevertheless have moral concern 
for those individuals and an obligation to face structural tragedies harming distant strangers in 
which the carer may engage or be complicit.  
I also showed many ways the carer may respond to expression of needs in the food 
system, depending on where they are situated. Notice of thesam  need in different ways by 
different individuals generates different obligations and responses. Sometimes individuals do 
respond directly to those in need, such as the case of Brta Alberts and the women at the egg 
processing facility in Wright County, Iowa. For the readers of this thesis, if we care about the 
women, we may work to support the building of programs like the Fair Food Program to operate 




not face the same harms or at least have better ways to ask f r and receive care when they are 
harmed.  
In discussing and analyzing the coffee supply chains and the examples of sexual assault 
and other labor abuses against migrant agricultural workers I have shown in this chapter that the 
version of the ethic of care defended in Chapter 1 can provide theoretically coherent and useful 
insight into issues of moral concern in the U.S. food system. In doing so, I have highlighted how 
it is useful for ethicists to move discussion away from debate on consumer choices and directly 
to where harms are occurring in the food system. The carer sees that it isn’t true that our only 
moral influence on the world is as consumers. We can respond to needs as citizens and neighbors 









This thesis has argued that it is possible and has shown ho it is possible for a Noddings-
style care ethic to generate global moral concern and provide ethical recommendations regarding 
issues in the United States food system. I made a case th t if our concern as ethicists interested in 
food is with the harms directly and indirectly caused by the food system, then we should move 
discussion towards examining where and how these harms occur, and away from debates on 
what the most ethical consumption choice is. I have started this project in this thesis by 
examining harms against migrant agricultural workers and investigating how those harms impact 
the web of care and their connection to structures in the food system.  
There is still however more work to be done on applying this care ethic to problems in 
the food system, and to other similar problems. Some of those areas for further discussion have 
been raised here. First, a thorough theoretical account is needed of how humans and non-human 
animals can or do enter into caring encounters or relations. After that is worked out, we can give 
an account of how, for example, the care ethicist approaches the issue of whether or not 
veganism or vegetarianism is a moral obligation, or if there is some other way in which carers 
should respond and engage with the issue of animals in agricultu al production. 
A second issue regarding the food system that needs attention is getting clearer on how 
the care ethicist can and should deal with harms that don’ clearly happen in relation or encounter 
with other individuals. I have in mind indirect effects of our food system like pollution and loss 
of biodiversity. These problems could directly harm indiviuals, but the agents of harm were 
contributed to incrementally by many persons, over time and over large spaces. Investigation of 




effectively deal with collective action problems towards parts of the world not capable of 
responding to care. 
A third issue that will become more important for the care ethicist to work out in the near 
future is how this care ethic will deal with the mainstream adoption and use of artificial 
intelligence. The care ethic points to humans and possibly other living beings as the only 
appropriate objects of care. They are also the only things that can then have needs worthy of 
ethical consideration. Additionally, they are the only beings with which we can have caring 
encounters and caring relations. If experiencing caring relations is experiencing the fundamental 
good for the care ethicist, what happens if our world becoms highly mechanized and rather than 
the farmer encountering the coyote, or the field worker encou tering the field supervisor, or the 
consumer encountering the grocery store clerk, persons are instead encountering AIs. Is this 
morally bad in the eyes of the carer? Some would argue that this is what market efficiency is 
going to move us towards and that a more efficient market is going to produce more good in the 
world because we will have more food more available and at lower prices and etc. I don’t think it 
is clear if the carer will accept this view of a more mechanized market or if the overall loss of 
encounter will actually be bad in the eyes of the carer. 
While there are still big issues to investigate, this thesis has s own that it is possible for 
the care ethic to be useful in analyzing and critiquing complex roblems involving distant 
strangers in the public sphere. The care ethicist, with that possibility in hand, now has to do more 
experimentation not only in their individual lives in their own caring encounters and relations to 
develop practical wisdom, but also in the policy sphere and social sciences to see what structures 
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Attention – Also ‘receptivity’, ‘receptive attention’, or ‘engrossment’ in the literature (Noddings, 
1984; 2002b). Becoming aware of another’s needs, goals and/or projects. 
Care ethicist – A person who makes a commitment to cultivate a caring chara ter and act from 
care (Noddings, 2002b, p. 30).  
Cared-for – Also, ‘the object of care’ or ‘the object of caring-for.’ This is the receiver of some 
caring disposition or activity, and in this thesis a human being. 
Carer - Also “one-caring”. The one who cares.  
Caring Activity – Also ‘work of care’, the ‘practice of care’, or ‘activity of care.’ The action 
generated by caring for or caring about that is directed towards attending to another’s 
needs. 
Caring Disposition – Also ‘affective states’ that may arise with or be involved with the internal 
states of caring. May include empathy, sympathy, love, affection, inclination, fellow 
feeling, or other emotions (Noddings, 2010b, p.36; 2002b, p.29) 
Caring Encounter – An encounter that meets the following definition: “(A,B) is a caring relation 
(or encounter) if and only if i) A cares for B—that is, A’s consciousness is characterized 
by attention and motivational displacement—and ii) A performs some act in accordance 
with i), and iii) B recognizes that A cares for B. If the encounter is part of a continuing 
relationship or series of encounters, B’s responses become part of what A receives in the 
next episode” (Noddings, 2002b, p.19).  
Caring Relations – The fundamental good and the only fixed good. “The connection between 




Caring-about (n.), to care about (v.) – Caring paradigmatically directed at abstract others. An 
internal state.  
Caring-for (n.), to care for (v.) – Caring paradigmatically directed at concrete others. An internal 
state characterized by attention and motivational displacement.  
Encounter – In this thesis, specifically a meeting with or of a human being, or coming across a 
human being. In general, “A meeting with someone or something” interpreted very 
broadly, including “stories, institutions, memories, cultural practices, artifacts and objects 
of learning” (Noddings, 2002b, p. 128 – 129). 
Ethical caring – Caring that involves ethical will, rather affective states. 
Expressed Needs – Needs expressed by the cared-for through “conscious and purposeful 
communication (e.g. language), or through conscious (e.g. getting in line for food) or 
unconscious (e.g. stomach rumbling) behavior)” (Noddings, 2002b, p. 64) 
Inferred Needs – Needs which originate in the carer, “often related to social, cultural, and similar 
goals” (Noddings, 2002b, p. 64). 
Internal State of Caring – Includes attention and motivational displacement.  
Motivational Displacement – Desire for fulfillment of another’s needs or projects; arising after 
attention.  
Natural caring – Caring that is generated with an affective component, rathe  than from ethical 
will.  
One-caring – See “carer.” 




Relational sense of care/caring – A conceptualization of care/caring/carers where the focus of the 
concept is on the relations and encounters of people, in contrast to the virtue sense where 
the focus is on the carer (Noddings, 2002b, p.19). 
The Basic Attitude – “Responding to needs with “I am here”” is the basic attitude of the care 
ethic, whether or not the carer does satisfy a need (Noddings, 2002b, p. 129).  
The object of care – The individual receiving care (ambiguous between caring about/for).  
Virtue sense of care/caring – A conceptualization of care/caring/carers where the focus f the 
concept is on the one-caring, in contrast to the relation l sense where the focus is on the 
caring relation (Noddings, 2002b, p. 19).  
